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REGULATING UNICORNS: DISCLOSURE 
AND THE NEW PRIVATE ECONOMY 
JENNIFER S. FAN* 
Abstract: “Unicorns” are private companies with valuations of a billion dollars 
or more. As their name indicates, unicorns were originally so rare as to be almost 
mythical. But Uber and other technology companies have ushered in a new era: 
we now have a blessing of unicorns, each one of which has the potential to trans-
form financial and cultural norms. Yet from a legal perspective, these behemoths 
are regulated just like their much smaller, non-mythical counterparts. Unicorns’ 
dizzying valuations have not been matched with any expansion or recalibration 
of regulation. As a result, vital information about these companies remains secret, 
perhaps for years, until an IPO moves a unicorn into the public realm. This Arti-
cle argues that this one-size-fits-all regulatory framework is insufficient. Though 
nominally private, the size and influence of unicorns renders their effect in the 
marketplace much more like that of a publicly held corporation. The fate of a 
unicorn affects stockholders, employees, and regional or even national econo-
mies. Regulation of unicorns should recognize that outsized power. As a result, 
this Article proposes rethinking the current regulatory regime in the context of 
unicorns. This Article is the first to critique the unicorn phenomenon within the 
securities regulation framework. It argues for enhanced disclosure requirements 
that will alleviate the risks of unicorns without restraining their innovation. It 
concludes by suggesting what types of disclosures are necessary, how such in-
formation should be disclosed, and when it should be disclosed. 
INTRODUCTION 
As recently as 2010,1 a private company would not be valued at $1 bil-
lion—such a valuation was considered in the realm of fantasy.2 But now, ven-
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 1 Aileen Lee, Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH 
(Nov. 2, 2013), [https://perma.cc/9MZL-6MZG] (indicating that “unicorns” were relatively rare as of late 
2013); cf. The Unicorn List: Current Private Companies Valued at $1B and Above, CB INSIGHTS (updat-
ed daily), https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies [https://perma.cc/3W8M-82HH] 
[hereinafter Unicorn List]. 
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ture capital deals with dizzying valuations3 and financings of $100 million or 
more are featured prominently in the media.4 In fact, venture capital-backed 
technology companies have had more than five times the number of $500 mil-
lion or more rounds from 2014 to June 2015 than the prior four years com-
bined.5 
But what legal implications do these valuations have? What role have dif-
ferent investors played in creating unicorns (private companies valued at over 
$1 billion) or decacorns (private companies valued at over $10 billion)? How 
have the terms of venture capital deals changed in light of these lofty valua-
tions? Have investors in unicorns been able to obtain special downside protec-
tion? Why are unicorns staying private longer? Should private companies with 
these high valuations be subject to different disclosure requirements? How 
does the advent of unicorns affect stockholders, employees, and local econo-
mies? Although business leaders have had robust discussions about these top-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Powerhouses like Amazon and Google were never worth $1 billion when they were private 
companies. See Erin Griffith & Dan Primack, The Age of Unicorns, FORTUNE (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:00 
AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/22/the-age-of-unicorns/ [https://perma.cc/DM9N-RD4V]. 
 3 Valuations are the amounts that venture capitalists, or VCs, determine that companies are worth. 
There is no exact science to this, but “VCs typically take into account many factors when deciding 
how to value a potential investment—some are quantifiable whereas others are completely qualita-
tive.” BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER THAN YOUR LAWYER AND 
VENTURE CAPITALIST 39 (2011). These factors may include the stage of the company, competition 
with other funding sources, experience of the entrepreneur and leadership team, the VC’s natural entry 
point, financials, and the current economic climate. See id. at 39–40. 
 4 Evelyn M. Rusli, Startup Values Set Records, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 29, 2014, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-startup-values-reach-the-sky-1419900636 [https://perma.cc/FJE6-
BND3]. In fact, financings in the technology sector commonly raise $100 million or more. The In-
sanely Common $100 Million+ Financing Round, CB INSIGHTS (May 21, 2015), https://www.
cbinsights.com/blog/mega-financing-round/ [https://perma.cc/62NU-BKP8]. Some private companies 
have raised over $1 billion in one financing. See Forget Billion-Dollar Valuations: These 7 Compa-
nies Raised $1B or More in a Single Round, CB INSIGHTS (Oct 1, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.
com/blog/billion-dollar-rounds/ [https://perma.cc/EC4L-5FZP] (identifying Didi Kuaidi, SoFi, 
Airbnb, Coupang, Uber, SpaceX, Xiaomi, Flipkart, Facebook, and JD.com as companies that raised a 
billion dollars or more in a single round, and noting that Uber had raised four $1 billion rounds). The 
2015 year-end review by the National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”) aptly captures the ven-
ture capital deal space:  
Investment levels in 2014 were remarkable in that they were the highest amount since 
2000, and the third-highest ever at $49.3 billion. This compares with $30.1 billion in 
2013, which was in line with the prior several years. However, the headlines and the 
dramatic increase were driven by a dozen or so companies receiving very large venture 
rounds in 2014. If you remove those deals from the totals, the numbers look more tradi-
tional.  
NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2015 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 9 
(2015) [hereinafter NVCA YEARBOOK]. 
 5 See The Half-Billion Dollar Round Explosion, CB INSIGHTS (June 8, 2015), https://www.cb
insights.com/blog/half-billion-dollar-explosion/?utm_source=CB+Insights+Newsletter&utm_campaign=
84673cad32-500MRound06_09_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9dc0513989-84673cad32-
86759461 [https://perma.cc/C2KU-M5N4]. 
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ics, legal scholars have remained relatively silent about the implications of 
unicorns in the transactional law context. In particular, scholars have not 
looked at whether unicorns should have disclosure obligations similar to public 
companies and what the ramifications are for employees and minority stock-
holders when companies stay private longer.6 
This Article argues that once a private company reaches unicorn status, it 
should be subject to some of the same reporting obligations as public compa-
nies to provide greater transparency and protect minority stockholders (i.e., 
employees). Although venture capital investors expect that the companies they 
invest in provide certain financial information to them (which is then memori-
alized in an investors’ rights agreement),7 other stockholders and interested 
parties typically do not have rights to such information. In particular, minority 
investors and other stockholders, such as employees or former employees who 
have exercised stock options, have limited or no rights to obtain financial in-
formation and other information relevant to making an investment decision. 
Although the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 20128 (“JOBS Act”) was 
intended to democratize the equity investment process, it did not adequately 
consider the implications of large private companies staying private longer by 
raising significant sums of money without the scrutiny of the public markets 
and their related disclosure, audit, and legal obligations. Many scholars have 
offered various viewpoints about the value and impact of disclosure generally,9 
but no one has analyzed whether this one-size-fits-all regulatory framework for 
private companies is sufficient for unicorns. This Article is the first to offer a 
proposal for how to regulate private companies when they enter the unicorn 
category and their valuations and impact equal or surpass that of public com-
panies. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains what a unicorn is and 
what role it plays in the current innovation ecosystem.10 It then provides an 
overview of a venture capital deal, the importance of Regulation D, and the 
legal documents that are used to memorialize it.11 Part II argues that although 
unicorns are technically private companies, their size and influence render 
their effect in the marketplace much more like that of a publicly held corpora-
tion.12 The fate of a unicorn affects stockholders, employees, and regional or 
even national economies. Therefore, regulation of unicorns should recognize 
                                                                                                                           
 6 To be clear, scholars have suggested tiered systems of disclosure, but in contexts other than 
unicorns. See infra notes 98–167 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure). 
 7 See infra notes 87–91 (providing more information on investors’ rights agreements). 
 8 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 9 See infra notes 98–167 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure). 
 10 See infra notes 19–97 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 45–97 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 98–167 and accompanying text. 
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that outsized power and create new tools for the care and feeding of unicorns 
to alleviate their risks without restraining their innovation. Part III analyzes the 
Form D13 filings and Restated Certificates of Incorporation of five prominent 
unicorns—Airbnb, Inc. (“Airbnb”), Dropbox, Inc. (“Dropbox”), Pinterest, Inc. 
(“Pinterest”), Snapchat, Inc. (“Snapchat”), and Uber Technologies Inc. (“Ub-
er”)—to demonstrate the failings of the current regulatory regime.14 This Part 
delves into what type of information is available, where more information 
needs to be disclosed, and what the implications may be for minority stock-
holders and employees based on publicly available information.15 Finally, Part 
IV looks at the new trend of late mega-fundings, also known as “private IPOs” 
(initial public offerings)16 for unicorns, which allows these companies to con-
tinue to operate with little transparency.17 This Article concludes that private 
IPOs only exacerbate the problems with transparency and equity that different 
stockholders of unicorns currently face, and further illustrate the need for en-
hanced disclosure.18 
I. THE RISE OF THE UNICORNS AND THE ANATOMY OF  
A VENTURE CAPITAL DEAL 
A. The Rise of the Unicorns: The New Normal 
Aileen Lee, founder of Cowboy Ventures, famously coined the phrase 
“unicorns,” describing companies valued at a billion dollars or more, in her 
seminal article in TechCrunch in 2013.19 At that time, thirty-nine companies 
were identified in the unicorn category, which translated into roughly “0.7 per-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Form D, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.
gov/about/forms/formd.pdf [https://perma.cc/55JN-CCWW]. If an issuer of securities relies on an 
exemption from registration provided in Regulation D, it must file a Form D with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and with any state that requires it, within fifteen calendar days after 
the “date of first sale” of securities in an offering containing the information requested. Id.; see also 
infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing Form D requirements). 
 14 See infra notes 168–321 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 168–321 and accompanying text. 
 16 A so-called “private IPO” is not an initial public offering at all. Because the median IPO raises 
$101 million, private companies that have financings that raise more than $100 million have become 
known as private IPOs. Data: There Are Now Over 9x More Private IPOs Than Actual Tech IPOs, 
CB INSIGHTS (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/private-ipo-tech/ [https://perma.cc/
N2YY-XWCJ]. 
 17 See infra notes 322–345 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 346–348 and accompanying text. 
 19 Ms. Lee’s definition of unicorn included venture-backed “U.S.-based software companies . . . 
valued at over $1 billion by public or private market investors” founded between 2003 and 2013. Lee, 
supra note 1. The definition of unicorn now applies to private companies with valuations of $1 billion 
or more. Id. 
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cent of venture-backed consumer and enterprise software startups.”20 This 
would equate to one in 1538 companies of that kind becoming unicorns.21 Ms. 
Lee noted that in the previous decade there were four new unicorns per year on 
average, with Facebook being a “super-unicorn.”22 Further, liquidity events23 
for unicorns took place, on average, more than seven years from the founding 
of the company.24 Recently, it was reported that a startup has a 1.28% chance 
of achieving unicorn status.25 “Interestingly, 15 companies [that] raised their 
first round of financing in 2013 or 2014 have already jumped into the billion 
dollar club highlighting the increasing pace at which unicorns are anointed.”26 
At first glance, the moniker “unicorn” seems appropriate for the elite 
companies achieving valuations of a billion dollars or more. Each of the mem-
bers of this unicorn club represents disruptive innovation that has the potential 
to change the face of how we use everyday services, how we communicate 
with others, and how we interact with technology in every facet of our lives. 
Upon closer inspection, however, these so-called unicorns are not a rarity. In 
fact, the number of unicorns has continued to climb at what some may say is 
an alarming speed, and now blessings27 of unicorns abound. Interestingly, the 
legal underpinnings for the venture capital deals in the unicorn realm have re-
mained largely unchanged despite these dizzying valuations. 
Unicorns are now ubiquitous.28 Indeed, some entrepreneurs have one ob-
jective when raising money—reaching a billion-dollar valuation.29 As one 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. But cf. Fred Wilson, The Billion Dollar Valuation Club, AVC (Nov. 3, 2013), http://
avc.com/2013/11/the-billion-dollar-valuation-club/ [https://perma.cc/PV75-5RVZ] (disputing the 
actual numbers that Ms. Lee used). 
 21 As Ms. Lee observed, “The tech news may make it seem like there’s a winner being born every 
minute—but the reality is, the odds are somewhere between catching a foul ball at an MLB game and 
being struck by lightning in one’s lifetime. Or, more than 100x harder than getting into Stanford.” 
Lee, supra note 1. 
 22 See id. (defining a super-unicorn as a private or public company worth more than $100 billion). 
Ms. Lee claims that one to three such super-unicorns are born each decade. Id. Past unicorns were 
Google and Amazon in the 1990s, Cisco in the 1980s, Apple, Oracle, and Microsoft in the 1970s, and 
Intel in the 1960s. Id. 
 23 Liquidity events are either initial public offerings or a merger or acquisition in the venture 
capital context. In the deal documents for a venture capital financing, the definition of what consti-
tutes a liquidity event is negotiated. 
 24 Lee, supra note 1. 
 25 Your Startup Has a 1.28% Chance of Becoming a Unicorn, CB INSIGHTS (May 25, 2015), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/unicorn-conversion-rate/ [https://perma.cc/KXD4-TBDP]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 A group of unicorns is called a blessing. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, Here’s Why the Tech Uni-
corns’ Dreams Won’t Come True, FORTUNE (Oct. 16, 2015, 6:08 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/10/
16/unicorns-ipo-market/ [https://perma.cc/EB8R-4EQZ]; Alan Murray, A Blessing of Unicorns, FOR-
TUNE (Jan. 22, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/22/a-blessing-of-unicorns/ [https://perma.
cc/78WL-RHRU]. 
 28 The Increasingly Crowded Unicorn Club in One Infographic, CB INSIGHTS (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/increasingly-crowded-unicorn-club/ [https://perma.cc/QUN8-GYBY]. 
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startup founder said of the billion-dollar valuation, “It does make a difference 
psychologically. One billion is better than $800 million because it’s the psy-
chological threshold for potential customers, employees, and the press.”30 Ven-
ture capital database CB Insights maintains a real-time list of these unicorns.31 
The number of unicorns rose especially quickly in 2015;32 in the second quar-
ter of 2015, a new unicorn emerged every three business days.33 As of March 
16, 2016, the top ten unicorns were collectively valued at a staggering $234.5 
billion.34 To put this in perspective, this valuation equals nearly forty-three 
percent of the total valuation of the 155 private companies identified as uni-
corns.35 Furthermore, the valuations of some of these unicorns surpass those of 
companies that recently went public, such as Box—provider of a secure con-
tent platform for businesses—and Twitter—an online social networking site 
that allows users to publicize short messages. Box and Twitter had market val-
uations of $1.48 billion36 and $11.41 billion,37 respectively, on March 16, 
2016. 
These mythical unicorns are now so common that a new type of uni-
corn—the “decacorn”—has come into general parlance; these are companies 
with a valuation of $10 billion or more.38 Private companies in the decacorn 
category, like Airbnb, Dropbox, Pinterest, Snapchat, and Uber, are household 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Griffith & Primack, supra note 2. For example, Stewart Butterfield, a startup founder, 
believed his startup, Slack, a business software company based in San Francisco, needed “the cachet 
of the billion-dollar mark.” Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Not everyone is in agreement on the exact number of unicorns. The list by CB Insights is the 
most current. As of March 16, 2016, there are 155 unicorns globally. See Unicorn List, supra note 1. 
Notably, The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones VentureSource are also keeping a list, titled “The 
Billion Dollar Startup Club,” which lists 146 unicorns globally. See Scott Austin et al., The Billion 
Dollar Startup Club, WALL STREET J. (last updated Mar. 2016), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-
dollar-club/ [https://perma.cc/B5UG-ZRXW]. 
 32 But cf. Amit Karp, Betting Against Unicorns, VENTURING STARTUP NATION (June 1, 2015), 
http://amitkarp.com/2015/06/01/betting-against-unicorns/?utm_source=CB+Insights+Newsletter&
utm_campaign=f9ceb3980d-Insuranceinvesting06_02_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9
dc0513989-f9ceb3980d-86759461 [https://perma.cc/WJG3-B3LX] (explaining why the high valua-
tions for Snapchat, Dropbox, Spotify, Square, and WeWork are not justified). 
 33 E-mail Newsletter from Anand Sanwal, CEO & Co-Founder, CB Insights, to CB Insights blog 
subscribers (July 23, 2015, 6:57 AM) (on file with author) (“Unicorns, once considered mythical and 
rare, are, in reality, no longer all that special. In Q2 2015, there was a new unicorn added to the club 
every 3 business days.”). 
 34 Unicorn List, supra note 1. 
 35 See id. 
 36 Box, Inc. Key Statistics, YAHOO! FINANCE (updated daily), http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s
=BOX+Key+Statistics [https://perma.cc/DD4V-B6HJ]. 
 37 Twitter, Inc. Key Statistics, YAHOO! FINANCE (updated daily), http://finance.yahoo.com/q/k
s?s=twtr+Key+Statistics [https://perma.cc/THB7-9CUZ]. 
 38 Jillian D’Onfro, There Are So Many $10 Billion Startups That There’s a New Name for Them: 
‘Decacorns,’ BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/decacorn-is-
the-new-unicorn-2015-3 [https://perma.cc/57G3-YK49]. 
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names.39 Against the backdrop of this investing frenzy, many industry experts 
predict that the current economic bubble will burst.40 Further, some state that 
the unicorns are overvalued.41 One prominent venture capitalist, Bill Gurley, a 
partner at Benchmark, observed that “[S]ilicon Valley as a whole, or  . . .  the 
venture-capital community or startup community, is taking on an excessive 
amount of risk right now—unprecedented since ’99” (the last tech bubble).42 
As it stands, only a few venture capital firms have had a high success rate with 
unicorns.43 
Ironically, for all the hype around unicorns, investors who wish to partici-
pate in financings for such unicorns in the later stages of a company tend to get 
lower returns:  
In fact, only 27% of the investments made by VCs in [u]nicorns 
have been “fund makers”—an investment that pays back the entire 
value of its fund, a kind of measuring stick in the VC world. In other 
words, most VCs investing in [u]nicorns are not coming away with 
outsized returns.44 
B. Anatomy of a Venture Capital Deal 
Where do unicorns fit in the funding universe? In order to understand 
unicorns, we must look to the anatomy of a venture capital deal and key terms. 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. 
 40 See Wilson, supra note 20. One such expert, Drew Nordlicht (Partner and Managing Director 
of HighTower Advisors) states: 
Private companies are staying private [longer], so the institutional community is simply 
going where they can get access to larger growing companies in need of capital . . . . 
The worry here is that these funds have an investor base that can redeem on any given 
day, causing a liquidity drain and forced selling inside the portfolio. 
Jeremy Quittner, Why Your Business Has a Unicorn Problem, INC. (May 13, 2015), http://www.inc.
com/jeremy-quittner/more-insitutional-investors-and-more-unicorns-and-the-tech-bubble-question.
html [https://perma.cc/8HN9-7AVY] (first alteration in original). 
 41 Cf. Lizette Chapman, ‘Unicorn’ Startups Say High Valuations Justified, Citing Big Growth 
Ahead, WALL STREET J.: VENTURE CAP. DISPATCH (May 7, 2015, 4:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
venturecapital/2015/05/07/unicorn-startups-say-high-valuations-justified-citing-big-growth-ahead/ 
[https://perma.cc/HRL2-K7VY]. 
 42 Yoree Koh & Rolfe Winkler, Venture Capitalist Sounds Alarm on Startup Investing, WALL 
STREET J. (Sept. 15, 2014, 3:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/venture-capitalist-sounds-alarm-
on-silicon-valley-risk-1410740054 [https://perma.cc/GTS9-M5NE]. 
 43 See Which Venture Capital Firms Are Best at Spotting Unicorns Early?, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 2, 
2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/billion-dollar-startup-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/
39RS-L7GK]; see also The Exceedingly Rare Unicorn VC, CB INSIGHTS (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/billion-dollar-exit-venture-capital/ [https://perma.cc/2FA4-Q4P3] 
(charting aggregate data about the number of unicorns in venture capital firms’ portfolios). 
 44 Chris Woodford, Investing: Unicorns Are Pretty, but Dragons Are More Desirable, WORKING 
CAP. REV. (Mar. 13, 2015), http://workingcapitalreview.com/2015/03/unicorns-are-pretty-but-
dragons-are-more-desirable/ [https://perma.cc/NEC5-HNY8]. 
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Before embarking on that discussion, however, it is important to understand 
what venture capital is and what it has the potential to do.45 Venture capital is 
the term commonly used to describe investments in highly speculative busi-
nesses, often early-stage technology companies.46 Such investments are illiq-
uid and venture capitalists may not get liquidity for their investment for years 
after the investment has been made, typically when the company goes public 
or is acquired.47 At this point, the venture capital firms and others who have 
invested in the company get liquidity if the company goes public or is ac-
quired.48 Venture capital brings not only money to a potentially disruptive, in-
novative company, but the expertise of the venture capital partners who typi-
cally take a board seat on the company as well.49 
                                                                                                                           
 45 According to the NVCA, 
Venture capital has enabled the United States to support its entrepreneurial talent and 
appetite by turning ideas and basic science into products and services that are the envy 
of the world. Venture capital funds build companies from the simplest form—perhaps 
just the entrepreneur and an idea expressed as a business plan—to freestanding, mature 
organizations. 
NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 7. 
 46 See, e.g., John Greathouse, Pssst . . . Here’s How to Become a Venture Capitalist, FORBES 
(Sept. 18, 2012, 10:39 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20151220230430/http://www.forbes.com/
sites/johngreathouse/2012/09/18/pssst-heres-how-to-become-a-venture-capitalist/. 
 47 NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 7 (“This money funds new ideas that could not be financed 
with traditional bank financing, that threaten established products and services in a corporation, and 
that typically require five to eight years to be launched.”). The 2015 NVCA Yearbook describes ven-
ture capital as 
quite unique as an institutional investor asset class. When an investment is made in a 
company, it is an equity investment in a company whose stock is essentially illiquid and 
worthless until a company matures five to eight years down the road. Follow-on in-
vestment provides additional funding as the company grows. These “rounds,” typically 
occurring every year or two, are also equity investment, with the shares allocated 
among the investors and management team based on an agreed “valuation.” 
Id. 
 48 Id. The 2015 NVCA Yearbook further notes: 
[V]enture funds generally exit their positions in [successful mature portfolio] compa-
nies by taking them public through an initial public offering (IPO) or by selling them to 
presumably larger organizations (acquisition, trade sale, or increasingly a financial buy-
er). This then lets the venture fund distribute the proceeds to investors, raise a new fund 
for future investment, and invest in the next generation of companies. 
Id. at 10. Statistically speaking, “[a]lthough the investor has high hopes for any company getting 
funded, only one in six ever goes public and one in three is acquired.” Id. at 7. 
 49 Indeed, the 2015 NVCA Yearbook notes that: 
[D]aily interaction with the management team is common. This limits the number of 
startups in which any one fund can invest. Few entrepreneurs approaching venture capi-
tal firms for money are aware that they essentially are asking for 1/6 of a person! Yet 
that active engagement is critical to the success of the fledgling company. 
Id. 
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New types of documents have been generated in the venture capital deal 
space, such as Series Seed financing documents50 and Series AA financing 
documents51 by Y Combinator, which provides seed money for startups in the 
amount of $120,000 in exchange for seven percent equity.52 This Article does 
not delve into the intricacies of documents in the seed stage of a venture capi-
tal financing. Instead, it provides a brief overview of Regulation D and the five 
main documents that provide the framework for the later-stage venture capital 
deals. This overview will help to frame the discussion and analysis included in 
the subsequent Parts of this Article. 
1. Regulation D 
The mission of the SEC “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”53 In the simplest terms, 
when securities are offered in the United States, they must be registered with 
the SEC or qualify for one of the exemptions from the registration require-
ments.54 In most venture capital financings, the private companies (also known 
as issuers) issuing securities rely on one of the three safe harbors of Regulation 
D, an SEC regulation under the Securities Act of 1933.55 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Series Seed is a crowdsourced set of documents released in 2010. Version 3.2, the latest ver-
sion of the Series Seed documents, includes a Term Sheet, Stock Investment Agreement (which com-
bines what was previously the Stock Purchase Agreement and Investors’ Rights Agreement), and 
Certificate of Incorporation. Version 3.2, SERIES SEED (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.seriesseed.
com/posts/2014/02/version-32.html [https://perma.cc/5EDB-6JCL]. These documents are intended for 
smaller, early stage investments in the $500,000 to $1.5 million range and were “designed to keep the 
most essential terms for the transaction and postpone the other terms for a later fundraising round 
where such an investment would be warranted.” About the Series Seed Documents, SERIES SEED (Feb. 
24, 2010), http://www.seriesseed.com/posts/2010/02/about-the-series-seed-documents.html [https://
perma.cc/Z9A9-E3WG]. 
 51 Series AA financing documents are open-source documents available on the Y Combinator 
website. Startup Documents, Y COMBINATOR, https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/#seriesaa 
[https://perma.cc/R9N4-L6WP]. They include a Series AA Certificate of Incorporation, Series AA 
Investors’ Rights Agreement, Series AA Stock Purchase Agreement, and board and stockholder con-
sents. Id. They were developed in 2008 for Y Combinator-funded startups to use when raising money 
with angels, with the goal of streamlining the early stage equity financing process. See id. 
 52 In addition to providing funding, Y Combinator also expects the founding team of the startups 
that it chooses to fund the startups’ move to the Bay Area for three months and to attend weekly din-
ners at Y Combinator that include talks by startup experts in various fields. About Y Combinator, Y 
COMBINATOR, https://www.ycombinator.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/A64H-U9Q3]. It hosts a Demo 
Day ten weeks into the program, which gives the startups an opportunity to showcase their products 
and services to a select audience. Id. 
 53 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/RN94-EQQX]. 
 54 See Use of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500(a) (2015). 
 55 See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS 
LAW 175 (4th ed. 2012). Note, however, that if an issuer fails to meet the parameters of Regulation D, 
it may still qualify for an exemption under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (provided that 
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One of the most important elements of Regulation D is the definition of 
“accredited investor” that is set forth in Rule 501 of Regulation D.56 Simply 
put, venture capital funds that meet certain assets tests, wealthy individuals 
who meet certain threshold requirements, and directors and executive officers 
of companies are all deemed accredited investors. 
The theory behind Regulation D is that accredited investors are financial-
ly sophisticated and therefore do not need all the protections of the securities 
laws.57 Typically, venture-backed companies rely on Rule 506(b) of Regulation 
D because it permits sales of securities for more than $5 million.58 Rule 506(b) 
allows offerings of any amount to an unlimited number of accredited investors 
and up to thirty-five sophisticated, unaccredited investors.59 Rule 506(c) of 
Regulation D differs because it allows private securities offerings to be made 
through general solicitations (through the television, newspaper, or social me-
dia), but only to accredited investors.60 Under this new section of Rule 506, 
which was promulgated under the JOBS Act, issuers must take reasonable 
steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors.61 Companies relying on 
Rule 506(b) or 506(c) are subject to Rule 10b-5 anti-fraud provisions for any 
persons making untrue statements, and there are “bad actor” restrictions re-
garding who can participate in offerings.62 The other Regulation D safe har-
bors, set forth in Rules 504 and 505, are not commonly used because they set 
                                                                                                                           
it meets the conditions set forth therein). See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (exempting certain transactions 
from registration requirements). Anecdotally, in the author’s conversations with well-known lawyers 
who specialize in venture capital financings, Series A and Series B companies raising money only 
from venture capitalists are increasingly relying on section 4(a)(2) and are not filing Forms D. 
 56 The full definition of “accredited investor” can be found at 17 C.F.R § 230.501(a) (2015). 
 57 See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 55, at 175. Note, however, that there are many in the 
securities regulation field, such as SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, who argue that revisiting the 
definition for “accredited investor” would be prudent. See Public Statement, Luis A. Aguilar, 
Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Revisiting the “Accredited Investor” Definition to Better Protect 
Investors (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/spch121714laa.html [https://perma.cc/
C7ZJ-4VXM]. Specifically, “there is nothing in the definition that helps to identify whether these 
individuals have the financial sophistication and/or investment experience to be able to assess whether 
any particular investment is appropriate for them.” Id. Furthermore, because the definition of accredit-
ed investor hinges on certain income or accumulated net worth thresholds, it may be under-inclusive 
because it may not include potential investors who would be viewed as financially sophisticated. See 
id. 
 58 17 C.F.R § 230.506(b) (2015). 
 59 Id. 
 60 17 C.F.R § 230.506(c); accord Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the 
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1621 
(2013) (“The reality is that with the removal of the general solicitation ban for Rule 506 offerings, this 
most-used exemption is now available with no mandated disclosure, with no limits on the selling 
process and without the usual incentives for due diligence found elsewhere in securities selling.”). 
 61 17 C.F.R § 230.506(c)(2)(ii). 
 62 17 C.F.R § 230.506(d). 
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limitations on the dollar amount of the offerings.63 If a company sells securities 
under Rules 505 or 506(b) to any purchaser that is not an accredited investor, it 
must furnish the information specified under Rule 502(b)(2) at a reasonable 
time prior to the sale.64 The information required depends on the size of the 
offering; in the context of unicorns, Rule 502(b)(2)(B)(3) would apply (“Offer-
ings over $7,500,000”).65 Therefore, unaccredited investors could expect to 
receive, at a minimum, unaudited financial statements with the exception of 
the balance sheet, which should be audited and dated within 120 days of the 
start of the offering. Although not required, the company could also choose to 
provide that same information to accredited investors. 
In connection with relying on Regulation D, a Form D must be filed with-
in fifteen calendar days of the date of first sale for each new offering of securi-
ties.66 A Form D requires information related to the issuer’s identity, principal 
place of business and contact information, related persons (executive officers, 
directors, and promoters), industry group, issuer size (which the issuer can de-
cline to disclose), federal exemption(s) and exclusion(s) claimed, type of fil-
ing, duration of offering, type(s) of securities offered, whether it is a business 
transaction, whether there is a minimum investment, whether there is sales 
compensation, the offering and sales amount, whether there are unaccredited 
investors, the total number of investors who already have invested in the offer-
ing, sales commissions and finder’s fees expenses, and use of proceeds.67 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Rule 504 exempts offerings of up to $1 million within a twelve-month period and imposes no 
limits on the number of purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2015). Rule 505 exempts offerings up to $5 
million within a twelve-month period and limits the number of unaccredited investors. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.505 (2015). 
 64 Although companies are not required to furnish such information to accredited investors, there 
is a note in Rule 502(b)(1) that indicates that it would be advisable in light of the antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2015) (“Note: When an issuer provides 
information to investors pursuant to paragraph (b)(1), it should consider providing such information to 
accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”). 
 65 See id. § 230.502(b)(2). Rule 502(b)(2)(B)(3) reads: 
Offerings over $7,500,000. The financial statement as would be required in a registra-
tion statement filed under the Act on the form that the issuer would be entitled to use. If 
an issuer, other than a limited partnership, cannot obtain audited financial statements 
without unreasonable effort or expense, then only the issuer’s balance sheet, which 
shall be dated within 120 days of the start of the offering, must be audited. If the issuer 
is a limited partnership and cannot obtain the required financial statements without un-
reasonable effort or expense, it may furnish financial statements that have been pre-
pared on the basis of Federal income tax requirements and examined and reported on in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards by an independent public or cer-
tified accountant. 
Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(B)(3). 
 66 See Form D, supra note 13, at 5. 
 67 Id.  
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2. Term Sheet 
The five main documents included in a traditional venture capital deal are 
the certificate of incorporation, the stock purchase agreement, the investors’ 
rights agreement (which is sometimes referred to as the registration rights 
agreement), the right of first refusal and co-sale agreement, and the voting 
agreement.68 These documents are standard for venture capital deals. Before 
these five documents are drafted, however, both sides will agree on basic 
terms, as described in a term sheet,69 a document that sets forth a roadmap for 
the terms of the deal. At the most basic level, the term sheet is about money 
and control. It provides the pre- and post-money valuation70 of the company, 
the price per share for the particular series of stock,71 the capitalization of the 
company, and the specific terms of the certificate of incorporation. Although 
the investors’ rights agreement and the right of first refusal and co-sale agree-
ment are referenced in the term sheet, the certificate of incorporation, the vot-
ing agreement, and the representations and warranties section of the stock pur-
chase agreement (and related disclosures) are usually the documents that take 
the most amount of time to negotiate. 
3. Certificate of Incorporation 
The certificate of incorporation is a public document filed with the Secre-
tary of State of the state in which the company is incorporated. It sets forth the 
rights, preferences, privileges, and restrictions of each class and series of 
stock.72 The major provisions in the certificate of incorporation are: capitaliza-
                                                                                                                           
 68 Typically, when company counsel has relevant experience, company counsel will draft the deal 
documents, and investors’ counsel will comment. Ancillary documents, such as the management 
rights letter and company counsel’s legal opinion, are not discussed in this Article, although they are 
featured on the NVCA’s website. See Model Legal Documents, NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 
http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE]. 
 69 See, e.g., NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, TERM SHEET, http://
nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow hyperlink to “Term 
Sheet”). 
 70 The pre-money valuation is the amount the venture capitalist determines that the company is 
worth before the investment. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 36. It is determined by look-
ing at a number of factors as detailed supra note 3. See also FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 
39–40. The post-money valuation is the sum of the pre-money valuation plus the amount of money the 
investors intend to put into the company. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 39–40. 
 71 The price per share is calculated by dividing the pre-money valuation by the fully-diluted num-
ber of shares. A fully-diluted basis is “a methodology for calculating any per share ratios whereby the 
denominator is the total number of shares issued by the company on the assumption that all warrants 
and options are exercised and preferred stock.” See NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 4, at 99. 
 72 See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, CERTIFICATE OF INCOR-
PORATION, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow 
hyperlink to “Certificate of Incorporation”) [hereinafter MODEL COI]. 
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tion,73 dividends,74 liquidation preference,75 conversion,76 antidilution protec-
tion,77 redemption,78 voting,79 protective provisions,80 and pay-to-play.81 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Capitalization sets forth the number of shares of preferred stock and common stock. The com-
mon stock number should take into account the preferred stock on an as-converted to common basis as 
well as the stock option pool. See id. at 3–4. 
 74 Dividends can provide additional time-based guaranteed upside to investors, but typically in 
financings on the West Coast, dividends are not “cumulative,” meaning they are paid only if declared 
by the company’s board of directors, and therefore have no meaningful value. Cumulative dividends 
were used in less than 10% of West Coast deals; in contrast, according to information from various 
law firm surveys, cumulative dividends were used in 30–50% of their East Coast deals. Dana M. War-
ren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 19 
(2012); WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S REPORT: PRIVATE COMPANY 
FINANCING TRENDS, FULL-YEAR 2015, https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/entreport/
Q42015/private-company-financing-trends.htm#top [https://perma.cc/PU85-MSPV] (noting that cu-
mulative dividends were used in 12%, 13%, and 3% of its private company financings (all rounds) in 
2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively, but not differentiating between East Coast and West Coast fi-
nancings). 
 75 Liquidation preference “impacts how the proceeds are shared in a liquidity event, which is 
usually defined as a sale of the company or the majority of the company’s assets.” FELD & MENDEL-
SON, supra note 3, at 41. There are two components to it: the preference and participation. Id. For 
example, terms may indicate that holders of a particular series of preferred stock “shall be entitled to 
receive in preference to the holders of the Common Stock a per share amount equal to [X] times the 
Original Purchase Price plus any declared but unpaid dividends.” Id. There are three types of partici-
pation: no participation (holders of preferred stock receive their money back first and receive nothing 
thereafter unless they choose to convert their stock to common stock), capped participation (holders of 
preferred stock receive their money back first and then share ratably with the holders of common 
stock up to a total liquidation amount per share equal to some multiple of the original purchase price), 
and full participation (holders of preferred stock receive their money back first and then share ratably 
with the holders of common stock with no cap). See id. at 42. 
 76 Conversion includes the investors’ right to convert preferred stock to common stock as well as 
the automatic conversion of preferred stock to common stock in the event of a firm commitment, 
underwritten initial public offering, or by a written request for such conversion from a certain percent-
age—such as a majority—of the preferred stock then outstanding. See MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 
16. 
 77 The antidilution provision is included “to protect investors in the event a company issues equity 
at a lower valuation than in previous financing rounds.” FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 56. 
There are weighted average antidilution provisions (both broad- and narrow-based) and ratchet-based 
antidilution provisions. See id. at 56–57 (providing a detailed description of how antidilution works). 
 78 Redemption is rarely invoked and is thought of as more of an East Coast term. See MODEL 
COI, supra note 72, at 33 n.60. 
 79 Unless specified in the certificate of incorporation, both the preferred stock and common stock 
vote as one class upon certain transactions. For example, under Delaware General Corporation Law 
(“DGCL”), a class vote is not required in certain transactions, such as mergers, reorganizations, or 
distributions upon dissolution. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West, Westlaw through 80 
Laws 2016, ch. 202) (“Merger or consolidation of domestic corporations”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 275 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2016, ch. 202) (“Dissolutions generally; procedure”). Under 
the DGCL, there can be class voting for the election of directors. 
 80 Protective provisions are analogous to veto rights; investors can veto certain actions by the 
company. See MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 13–16. 
 81 A “pay-to-play” provision requires investors to participate in future financings to maintain their 
pro rata share in order to avoid pre-negotiating penalties, such as the forced conversion of their pre-
ferred stock to common stock. See id. at i. 
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4. Stock Purchase Agreement 
The stock purchase agreement provides for the purchase, sale, and closing 
of the venture capital financing. Specifically, it sets forth the price per share for 
the series of preferred stock being offered and the number of shares of pre-
ferred stock authorized for issuance in the offering.82 It also includes the me-
chanics of the purchase of preferred stock—the closing date83 and conditions 
to closing. There are also representations and warranties that the company 
makes to investors and vice-versa.84 Sometimes founders may be asked to 
make representations and warranties as well, although this is much less com-
mon in venture capital financings generally.85 Purchasers of the preferred stock 
are also asked to make a limited set of representations; this is primarily to es-
tablish that they are eligible to participate in the offering and qualify for ex-
emptions under applicable state and federal securities law. In addition, there 
are covenants of the company and miscellaneous terms, such as amendment 
and waiver, payment of investors’ counsel,86 and a conflict waiver. 
5. Investors’ Rights Agreement 
The investors’ rights agreement governs the rights of the major investors 
as to how and when they can cause the company to register shares of common 
stock issuable to the investors. It also sets forth major investors’ access to cer-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, STOCK PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow 
hyperlink to “Stock Purchase Agreement”) [hereinafter MODEL SPA] (discussing standard provisions in 
a stock purchase agreement). 
 83 A stock purchase agreement can be drafted to allow for multiple closings. 
 84 The representations and warranties made by the company can be hotly negotiated:  
The purpose of the Company’s representations is primarily to create a mechanism to 
ensure full disclosure about the Company’s organization, financial condition and busi-
ness to the investors. The Company is required to list any deviations from the represen-
tations on a Disclosure Schedule, the preparation and review of which drives the due 
diligence process on both sides of the deal. 
MODEL SPA, supra note 82, at 5 n.14. 
 85 Founders’ representations are not often seen: 
[These representations] are more likely to appear if Founders are receiving liquidity 
from the transaction, or if there is heightened concern over intellectual property (e.g., 
the Company is a spin-out from an academic institution or the Founder was formerly 
with another company whose business could be deemed competitive with the Compa-
ny), or in international deals. Founders’ representations are even less common in subse-
quent rounds, where risk is viewed as significantly diminished and fairly shared by the 
investors, rather than being disproportionately borne by the Founders. 
Id. at 22 n.44. 
 86 It is customary for the company to pay investors’ legal fees, which is typically capped at 
$25,000 to $40,000 for early stage financings. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 12. 
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tain information from the company, and their ability to participate in future 
equity offerings. Therefore, a fairly standard investors’ rights agreement will 
include registration rights,87 information rights,88 board observation rights,89 
right to future stock issuances,90 and post-closing covenants.91 
6. Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement 
The purpose of the right of first refusal and co-sale agreement is to keep a 
company’s capital stock within the group of existing stockholders, thereby 
preventing transfer of control to competitors, non-strategic parties, and the 
like.92 In the event that a “Key Holder” wants to transfer its holdings, it must 
first offer the company the right to purchase such shares and then offer that 
right to a defined group of investors (typically the major investors).93 Only 
after the company and investors refuse to purchase the shares may the Key 
Holder proceed to sell its shares to the proposed transferee, and in that event, 
other investors are allowed to participate in the sale on a pro rata basis based 
on their holdings in the company.94 Essentially, the right of first refusal and co-
sale agreement is intended to restrict the transfer of shares by Key Holders 
with certain limited exceptions.95 
                                                                                                                           
 87 There are three types of registration rights: demand (investor demands that the private company 
file a registration statement), piggyback (investors “piggyback” on the company’s intention to register 
its securities), and Form S-3 (short-form registration). See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL 
LEGAL DOCUMENTS, INVESTOR RIGHTS AGREEMENT 5–8 & n.7, http://nvca.org/resources/model-
legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow hyperlink to “Investor Rights Agreement”) 
[hereinafter MODEL IRA]. 
 88 See infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (discussing provisions in the NVCA’s Model 
Investors’ Rights Agreement). 
 89 See infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text (discussing provisions in the NVCA’s Model 
Investors’ Rights Agreement). 
 90 A right of first offer is the investors’ right to participate in future issuances of stock (which 
differs from the right of first refusal under a right of first refusal and co-sale agreement). Under the 
terms of the right of first offer, the company must first offer each Major Holder (as that term is de-
fined in the document) an opportunity to maintain their pro rata interest in the company in the next 
round of financing. See MODEL IRA, supra note 87, at 24–27. 
 91 Post-closing covenants can range from purchasing insurance to fixing a problem post-closing 
that was discovered during the diligence process. 
 92 See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, RIGHT OF FIRST 
REFUSAL AND CO-SALE AGREEMENT, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ [https://
perma.cc/29VP-LBAE] (follow hyperlink to “Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement”) [here-
inafter MODEL ROFR & CO-SALE AGREEMENT] (providing standard provisions in a Right of First 
Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement). 
 93 “Key Holders” are typically defined as the stockholders (including founders and key employ-
ees) who hold a sizable chunk of the company’s common stock. 
 94 See MODEL ROFR & CO-SALE AGREEMENT, supra note 92, at 6. 
 95 See id. at 9–11. 
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7. Voting Agreement 
The voting agreement contractually obligates the founders (i.e., major 
stockholders) and investors to vote their shares in board elections in favor of 
particular individuals.96 By doing so, the composition of the board is ensured. 
If negotiated by investors and agreed upon in the term sheet, drag-along 
rights97 may also be included in the voting agreement. 
II. THE CASE FOR INCREASED DISCLOSURE FOR UNICORNS 
Part I provides background on unicorns as unique economic creatures that 
have become the new normal in venture capital financings. In light of this 
characterization, Part II argues that the current regulatory framework is not 
sufficient for the new reality of unicorns. Presently, the only documents avail-
able to the public are the companies’ Form D filings98 and restated certificates 
of incorporation.99 According to Professor Louis Loss of Harvard Law School 
and Joel Seligman, President of the University of Rochester, “[T]here is the 
recurrent theme throughout [the federal securities laws] of disclosure, again 
disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But 
‘the truth shall make you free.’”100 The idea is that under a disclosure-based 
regime, the full and fair disclosure of pertinent information regarding the secu-
rities being marketed will adequately protect investors101 by “provid[ing] in-
vestors with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment and 
                                                                                                                           
 96 This agreement must work in tandem with the certificate of incorporation. The voting agree-
ment ensures that the designee of a particular preferred holder—typically the lead investor in a 
round—will have a particular “seat” on the board. Note, however, that the fact that a particular direc-
tor was elected by certain holders of a particular class or series of stock does not negate that individu-
al’s fiduciary duties to all stockholders of the company. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., Nos. 7075 & 7079, 
1988 WL 124325, at *743 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1988) (“The defendants correctly argue that the direc-
tors’ fiduciary duty runs to the corporation and to the entire body of shareholders generally, as op-
posed to specific shareholders or shareholder subgroups.”), aff’d, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990). 
 97 Drag-along rights contractually obligate minority stockholders to vote their shares in favor of a 
sale of the company, thereby preventing an attempt to block any such sale. In re Trados Inc. Share-
holder Litigation, a 2013 Delaware Chancery Court decision, may bolster the case to include drag-
along rights, as the court suggested in dicta that limiting the board’s exposure to fiduciary claims may 
be possible by using drag-along provisions. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 56–57 
n.32 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 98 Form D filings are publicly available without cost through the SEC’s website. See EDGAR: 
Search Tools, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm [https://
perma.cc/633N-AKVS]. 
 99 A copy of a private company’s certificate of incorporation may be purchased from the secretary 
of state of the state where the company was incorporated. See, e.g., Certification Memo, STATE OF 
DEL. DIV. OF CORP., http://corp.delaware.gov/certmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB4J-UET3]. 
 100 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 45 (3d ed. revised 1998). 
 101 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12. 
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fend for themselves.”102 As Justice Brandeis noted on this matter, “Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”103 
Uber (which is more fully discussed in Part III) is one example of a uni-
corn with an outsized impact. Its reach is vast—the company currently oper-
ates in six continents,104 forty-five countries,105 and 300 cities.106 According to 
reports, it “services millions of customers and employs hundreds of thousands 
of drivers.”107 The number of drivers for this five-year-old company has in-
creased dramatically to meet consumer demand. Recently, the Chief Executive 
Officer (“CEO”) of Uber reported that the company had “26,000 drivers in 
New York City alone; 15,000 in London; 22,000 in San Francisco; 10,000 in 
Paris; and 20,000 in Chengdu, China.”108 Uber has over 3000 employees 
worldwide109 and is expected to reach $10 billion in gross revenue at the end 
of 2015.110 Because Uber nets twenty percent of every transaction, this 
amounts to $2 billion in net revenue for the company.111 Despite these stagger-
ing numbers, little is known about Uber except what the company chooses to 
report to the media. Uber’s impact on local economies becomes even more 
apparent when looking at a particular market, such as Chicago.112 In Chicago 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 12. A disclosure-based regime also means that the SEC does not need to engage in the 
much more time-consuming evaluation of the merits of the securities. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by 
the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 
417, 418 (2003). 
 103 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 104 Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-
labor-ruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PWU6-3MLT]. 
 105 Alyson Shontell, Uber Is Generating a Staggering Amount of Revenue, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 
15, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-projection-in-2015-2014-11 
[https://perma.cc/XUM5-7HER]. 
 106 Isaac & Singer, supra note 104. But see infra notes 293–300 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the difficulty of evaluating unicorns’ revenue and operations). 
 107 Alison Griswold, In Search of Uber’s Unicorn, SLATE (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/10/uber_driver_salary_the_ride_sharing_company
_says_its_drivers_make_great.1.html [https://perma.cc/2M2S-BUU2]; see infra notes 286–321 and 
accompanying text (providing different numbers for Uber). 
 108 Isaac & Singer, supra note 104. In contrast, there are approximately 13,000 yellow cabs in 
New York City. Matt Flegenheimer & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in Struggle 
Over New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/nyregion/
city-hall-and-uber-clash-in-struggle-over-new-york-streets.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7D3N-5ARC]. 
 109 Maya Kosoff & Nathan McAlone, Where Are They Now: Meet 12 of Uber’s First Employ-
ees—Three of Them Are Now Billionaires, BUS. INSIDER (June 4, 2015, 5:35 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/ubers-first-employees-2015-6?op=1 [https://perma.cc/R2DE-3YEU]. 
 110 Shontell, supra note 105. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See Andrew MacDonald, UberDATA: Uber’s Economic Impact on the City of Chicago, UBER 
NEWSROOM (Mar. 12, 2014), http://newsroom.uber.com/chicago/2014/03/uberdata-ubers-economic-
impact-on-the-city-of-chicago/ [https://perma.cc/SJS8-GMHB]. 
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in 2013, Uber had 25,000 rides, was associated with 1049 new jobs, and had a 
total gross impact of over $46 million on the city’s economy.113  
Unicorns like Uber also demonstrate the inadequacy of other regulatory 
frameworks outside the securities realm. Recently, the California Labor Com-
missioner’s Office ruled that an Uber driver was an employee and not an inde-
pendent contractor, as Uber claims.114 If Uber’s appeal is unsuccessful, this 
would mean increased revenue for social security, healthcare, and other bene-
fits for Uber drivers in California, and the unresolved question of whether Ub-
er drivers should be classified as employees or independent contractors could 
have implications for Uber drivers in other states.115 It also leads to larger poli-
cy questions regarding how different worker classifications affect low-wage 
workers, not only among unicorns. 
A study done by Arun Sundararajan of New York University Stern School 
of Business and research scientist Samuel Fraiberger analyzed two years of 
data from a car-share company, Getaround, and found that 
peer-to-peer markets improve consumer welfare. These increases in 
surplus grow consistently with the fraction of the population who 
have access to the marketplace, and with the level of marketplace li-
quidity, or the fraction of supply and demand requests that are ful-
filled. Predicted consumer surplus gains in the automobile industry 
are substantial, ranging from 0.8% to 6.6%, which corresponds to 
billions of dollars of value creation.116 
Additionally, below-median-income consumers have a higher demand for 
Uber-type services than above-median-income consumers, which suggests 
“fairly dramatic shifts away from automobile ownership as the popularity and 
efficiency of such marketplaces grows.”117 In short, Uber is changing the 
transportation behavior of below-median-income consumers. 
Airbnb is another example of a unicorn’s effect on local economies and 
highlights the need for increased disclosure. In 2010, Airbnb booked 100,000 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See id. 
 114 See Isaac & Singer, supra note 104. 
 115 See id. In addition to their outsized impact on economies, unicorns may upend social and cul-
tural norms. See Jonathan V. Hall & Allan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s 
Driver-Partners in the United States 3 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 
587, 2015), http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp010z708z67d [https://perma.cc/C9FD-7B58] 
(analyzing the impact Uber has on the changing notions of work with respect to hours, flexibility, and 
participants in the sharing economy). 
 116 Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundarajan, Peer-to-Peer Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy 
4 (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus. Research Paper, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574337 [https://
perma.cc/927J-9PTY]. 
 117 Id. at 27. 
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nights in the month of January;118 that number has skyrocketed to over 500,000 
guests per night in May 2015,119 “making them comparable in inventory and 
transaction volume to the world’s largest hotel brands.”120 According to a Bar-
clays research report, “Airbnb offers more rooms than many of the largest ho-
tel groups in the world—Hilton, InterContinental and Marriott—which each 
maintain just under 700,000 rooms.”121 The report further states that “Airbnb 
currently represents as much as 17.2% of hotel room supply in New York, 
11.9% in Paris, and 10.4% in London . . . and those percentages are projected 
to increase.”122 In fact, it may triple its number of bookings and have 129 mil-
lion room-nights available per year by the end of 2016; at this rate, Airbnb 
could outpace the largest hotel companies in just a few years.123  
It would be unthinkable to have little to no information on a large hotel 
chain like Hyatt (which Airbnb has surpassed in valuation),124 but that is exact-
ly the predicament we find ourselves in with Airbnb because disclosure mech-
anisms have not been recalibrated to address the veil of secrecy that currently 
exists. Between 2012 and 2013, 400,000 Airbnb guests visited New York City 
and “spent $632 million, supporting 4,580 jobs.”125 Although most hotels in 
New York are located in midtown Manhattan, eighty-two percent of Airbnb’s 
accommodations were located across other parts of New York City, thereby 
dispersing the economic benefits across the city.126  
Despite its successes, however, Airbnb must address the question of how 
certain laws, such as housing and taxation, apply to them.127 In another exam-
                                                                                                                           
 118 M.G. Siegler, Airbnb Tucked in Nearly 800% Growth in 2010; Caps off the Year with a Slick 
Video, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 6, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/06/airbnb-2010/ [https://perma.
cc/LX8L-K84B]. 
 119 Alexia Tsotsis, Airbnb Hopes to Have Almost a Million Stays a Night by Summer, 
TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/27/airbnb-hopes-to-have-almost-a-
million-stays-a-night-by-summer/ [https://perma.cc/HYE3-S87T]. The company expects this number 
to reach 800,000 in the summer of 2015. Id. 
 120 Fraiberger & Sundarajan, supra note 116, at 2–3. 
 121 Zainab Mudallal, Airbnb Will Soon Be Booking More Rooms Than the World’s Largest Hotel 
Chains, QUARTZ (Jan. 20, 2015), http://qz.com/329735/airbnb-will-soon-be-booking-more-rooms-
than-the-worlds-largest-hotel-chains/ [https://perma.cc/W5LA-H5RQ]. Unlike its hotel counterparts, 
however, Airbnb does not own its rooms and the rooms are not available year-round. See id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See id. 
 124 Ankit Ajmera, Airbnb Valued at $13 Billion as It Discusses Employee Stock Sale—WSJ, REU-
TERS (Oct. 23, 2014, 9:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/airbnb-financing-idUSL
3N0SI7M120141024 [https://perma.cc/RZM7-2WMT]. 
 125 Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation and 
Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 104–05 (2015). 
 126 See id. at 105. 
 127 See id. at 109; see also Zak Stone, Living and Dying on Airbnb, MATTER (Nov. 8, 2015), 
https://medium.com/matter/living-and-dying-on-airbnb-6bff8d600c04 [https://perma.cc/KA8K-SEWH] 
(“Staying with a stranger or inviting one into your home is an inherently dicey proposition. Hotel 
rooms are standardized for safety, monitored by staff, and often quite expensive. Airbnb rentals, on 
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ple, between June 2011 and May 2012, Airbnb generated $56 million in eco-
nomic activity in San Francisco and supported 430 jobs.128 On average, Airbnb 
guests stayed longer than they would in a hotel (and spent more because of the 
money they saved on accommodations).129 They also visited more neighbor-
hoods compared to hotel guests (6.2 out of 18 neighborhoods for Airbnb guests 
and 4.2 for hotel guests).130 Airbnb did not affect hotel occupancy rates ad-
versely, either.131 Therefore, the businesses supplying accommodations bene-
fitted overall. As a point of contrast, a Boston University study on Airbnb and 
its impact on the Texas hotel industry found that Airbnb had a slight impact on 
lower-priced hotels and those hotels not focused on business travelers.132 The 
affected hotels, however, decreased prices, benefiting all consumers.133 In the 
end, Airbnb users enjoy decreased prices and increased variety in types of ac-
commodations, and Airbnb hosts have the opportunity to earn extra income.134 
Unicorns can spur economic development in another way, as well; their 
sheer size and demand for the services they provide create a need for infra-
structure and services that assist these companies, influencing the growth of 
businesses in other industries. For example, there is a growing cadre of 
startups in the on-demand infrastructure and services space that help to provide 
background checks, route and vehicle optimization, logistics, and the like for 
unicorns such as Uber and Airbnb.135 
                                                                                                                           
the other hand, are unregulated, eclectic, and affordable, and the safety standards are only slowly 
materializing.”). Even when regulations are proposed, they may be defeated given the deep pockets of 
Airbnb. For example, Proposition F in San Francisco, which would have put a limit on the number of 
nights a host would be allowed to rent out his or her property and imposed fines of up to $1000 per 
night for violations, was defeated. Elizabeth Weise, San Francisco to Vote on Measure to Allow 
Neighbors to Sue Over Airbnb, USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/2015/10/29/san-francisco-airbnb-proposition-f-regulation-sharing-economy-rentals-short-
term/74631024/ [https://perma.cc/N476-ZQAR]; see also Mollie Reilly, San Francisco Votes Down 
Tough Airbnb Regulations, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2015, 1:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/airbnb-san-francisco-vote_us_5637d49ae4b027f9b969ac7c [https://perma.cc/T92G-U5NF]. 
Airbnb spent over $8 million on this effort. See Reilly, supra. 
 128 HR&A ADVISORS, INC., AIRBNB ECONOMIC IMPACTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND ITS NEIGH-
BORHOODS, FINDINGS REPORT PREVIEW 35 (2012), http://www.deperslijst.com/persbericht/econ_
impact_Final_Report_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F6V-FQD5]. 
 129 Id. at 34. 
 130 Id. at 41. 
 131 Id. at 43. 
 132 Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on 
the Hotel Industry 22–25 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2016), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 [https://perma.cc/KTD6-3HGN]. 
 133 See id. at 27. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Pickaxes and Shovels: 35 Startups Providing Infrastructure for the On-Demand Boom, 
CB INSIGHTS (July 14, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/infrastructure-for-on-demand-
startups/ [https://perma.cc/67UR-95QC]. 
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Recent media coverage also highlights the extent to which employees 
have been harmed when unicorns fail to be transparent.136 One has to look no 
further than what happened when Good Technology was acquired by Blackber-
ry in late 2015—many employees felt blindsided when they found that their 
shares were worthless.137 In the recent IPO of Square, the company was valued 
at less than its valuation as a private company; this was arguably not the 
hoped-for outcome.138 Investors were protected due to the ratchet they had ne-
gotiated during the last round of equity financing; the ratchet “guaranteed a 20 
percent premium on their investment . . . meaning Square had to issue more 
shares to those investors, further devaluing the stock owned by employees.”139 
One journalist has observed: 
Today’s information scarcity means each new shred of bad news 
makes us rightly wonder which other startups are hiding dysfunc-
tion. The lack of transparency is a problem for startup investors, and 
it’s a problem for the companies doing business with startups. But 
it’s really a problem for startup employees. They often don’t know 
much more than we do about the health of the companies they work 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Sarah Frier & Adam Satariano, Big IPO, Tiny Payout for Many Startup Workers, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-17/big-ipo-tiny-
payout-for-many-startup-workers [https://perma.cc/3TSX-R2C4]. One report explains, “Many execu-
tives, early investors, and even later investors are able to cash out before the rank and file, or bargain 
for guarantees that help ensure a bonanza . . . . Ordinary employees are typically without meaningful 
financial protections or even a clear sense of what their equity stakes mean . . . .” Id.; see also Sarah 
Frier & Adam Satariano, Square Employees Find Some of Their Stock Options Under Water, BLOOM-
BERG BUS. (Nov. 19, 2015, 4:44 PM) [hereinafter Square Employees], http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-11-19/square-employees-find-some-of-their-stock-options-under-water?utm_cam
paign=sniply&utm_medium=sniply&utm_source=sniply [https://perma.cc/3YSH-SV3Z] (discussing 
the Square IPO and how Square’s employees did not get the windfall they expected). 
 137 Katie Benner, When a Unicorn Start-up Stumbles, Its Employees Get Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/technology/when-a-unicorn-start-up-stumbles-its-
employees-get-hurt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/38FT-FTV2] (giving examples of how employees 
were unaware of the true financial situation of their company and were affected by taxes levied by the 
Internal Revenue Service when their shares were considered valuable assets). As one reporter stated, 
What Good [Technology]’s employees experienced is an example of who loses out 
when a company backed by venture capital goes south. While plenty of people—
including founders, top executives and investors—are involved in the rise of a start-up, 
those hit the hardest during a company’s fall are the rank-and-file employees. 
Id. Good Technology common stock was worth $0.44 (or 10% of what it was worth the prior year); the 
preferred stock was worth seven times as much in the acquisition. Paul Sawers, After Good Technology’s 
$425M Fire Sale to BlackBerry, a Shareholder Offers His Windfall to Colleagues Who Lost Out, VEN-
TUREBEAT (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:55 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2016/01/11/after-good-technologys-425m-
fire-sale-to-blackberry-an-entrepreneur-offers-his-windfall-to-colleagues-who-lost-out/ [https://perma.
cc/HH7J-BH9V]. 
 138 See Square Employees, supra note 136. 
 139 Id. (noting that late stage investors require “ratchets” which essentially gives these investors 
more downside protection if the company performs poorly). 
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for. Or worse, their CEOs sell them on the gospel of “crushing it” 
even as the wheels fall off.140 
In the midst of the unicorn craze, some mutual funds, such as Fidelity, 
marked down their investments in well-known startups (that also happen to be 
unicorns); the list included Dropbox, Snapchat, and Zenefits, among others.141 
This was an unwelcome surprise to the companies and venture capitalists that 
were accustomed to controlling the narrative regarding such companies.142 In 
response, venture capitalists said that 
stamping a value every quarter on a company such as Snapchat, 
which still periodically reinvents its business model, doesn’t make 
sense. Two backers of the recently devalued companies . . . say 
startups may now be more reluctant to take money from mutual fund 
companies. [Matt] McIlwain [of Madrona Venture Group] blames 
them for driving up valuations in the first place by overpaying for 
access to hot deals.143   
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, the current disclosure regime is 
woefully inadequate. Much of the information provided above came after 
many hours of sifting through numerous sources. Put simply, unicorns are too 
big to regulate under the current regulatory framework. Companies that have 
reached unicorn status are so big and their impact on investors, employees, and 
local economies so broad that they merit new disclosure requirements based on 
market valuation. Under the current securities regulation regime, these compa-
nies are not subject to any minimum disclosure requirements, and in the aggre-
                                                                                                                           
 140 Erin Griffith, Private Startups “Crush It.” Public Companies Get Crushed, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 
2016, 11:36 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/05/startup-ipo-uber/ [https://perma.cc/8F8B-B9HH] 
(noting that some startups, such as Pinterest, are being more transparent). 
 141 Dan Primack, Why Fidelity’s Markdowns Could Rock the Startup and VC Worlds, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 13, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/why-fidelitys-markdowns-could-rock-the-
startup-and-vc-worlds/ [https://perma.cc/W5PP-SGWB]. Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, and The Hartford 
are among those mutual fund managers that have marked down the stock of their private investments. 
Dan Primack, Beyond Fidelity: Even More Mutual Fund Markdowns of Tech Startups, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 17, 2015, 4:53 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/17/mutual-fund-markdowns-startups/ [https://
perma.cc/T5SH-VMBC]. 
 142 Sarah Frier & Dina Bass, Silicon Valley’s Hottest Startups Get a Taste of Going Public With-
out the IPO, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 18, 2015, 1:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-11-18/silicon-valley-s-hottest-startups-get-an-unexpected-taste-of-going-public-without-
the-ipo [https://perma.cc/2FTT-JJDH]. 
 143 Id. Max Wolff, Chief Economist at Manhattan Venture Partners, stated: “It’s become de 
rigueur for companies to double in value because 12 months have passed and they found new inves-
tors. If that doesn’t trip your alarm bells, then your alarm bells have failed . . . . The companies are 
overvalued. They shouldn’t kill the messenger.” Id. 
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gate they are employing thousands of people and are valued at almost half a 
trillion dollars.144  
Such obligations will create some amount of operational burden on these 
companies, but in balancing the importance of disclosure for stockholders, 
employees, and other parties, disclosure is warranted; especially because uni-
corns are raising hundreds of millions of dollars—more than some companies 
raise when they go public. Enhanced disclosure can take several forms: (1) 
providing more information on the Form D; (2) making the restated certificates 
of incorporation more easily attainable; (3) having a plain English version of 
the key terms of the certificate of incorporation available; and (4) providing 
periodic financial information similar to what companies would need to pro-
vide for unaccredited investors in a private placement. 
A. The Current State of Affairs 
Under section 3 of the National Venture Capital Association’s (“NVCA”) 
Model Investors’ Rights Agreement, a company is required to provide major 
investors with year-end, quarterly, and monthly financial statements,145 as well 
as budgets and business plans. There may also be a “catch-all” provision that 
provides that major investors may request information “relating to the financial 
condition, business, prospects, or corporate affairs of the Company.”146 It is 
important to note that only those falling under the definition of “major inves-
tors” are entitled to such information rights. This definition is based on owner-
ship of a threshold amount of preferred stock on an as-converted to common 
stock basis that would be high enough to include even a venture capital firm 
with minimal holdings, without subjecting the company to onerous disclosure 
                                                                                                                           
 144 As of March 16, 2016, the total valuation is $550 billion. See Unicorn List, supra note 1; cf. 
William D. Cohan, Good Luck Getting Out!, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 2016, at 56 (listing 173 unicorns worth 
$585 billion). 
 145 See MODEL IRA, supra note 87, at 20. For year-end financial statements, this may include 
audited balance sheets, statements of income and cash flows, and statements of stockholders’ equity. 
For quarterly and monthly financial statements, it would include unaudited balance sheets, statements 
of income and cash flows, and possibly statements of stockholders’ equity. 
 146 Id. at 22. As observed in a footnote to the Investors’ Rights Agreement’s “Information and 
Observer Rights” section, 
Some investors request that the Company provide information relating to material liti-
gation, regulatory matters, material defaults under credit facilities, and other material 
events and occurrences. Note, however, that if the investing entity is entitled to a Board 
seat, there is little need (at least for that particular investor) to impose these additional 
reporting obligations on the Company. 
Id. at 22 n.34. The theory behind this idea is that, as a board member, the investor would already have 
access to this type of information because these topics would undoubtedly be discussed in board meet-
ings. 
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requirements.147 Unsurprisingly, the contractual definition of the type of in-
formation required for major investors is much broader than what is required 
under the securities laws.148 This stems from the notion that venture capitalists 
are not passive investors, but instead play active roles in developing the com-
pany. Some investors may even negotiate board observer rights, allowing them 
to sit in on board meetings in a nonvoting capacity and entitling them to more 
information, such as notices, minutes, consents, and other materials that a 
company provides to its directors.149 
Although unicorns will include these standard provisions regarding in-
formation rights and board observer rights for the benefit of their major inves-
tors, greater transparency is warranted for all stockholders. In the case of a 
public company, any individual can obtain detailed information about the 
company, including financial statements, on the SEC’s website.150 Public com-
panies are required to file quarterly (Form 10-Q)151 and annual (Form 10-K)152 
reports with the SEC. If material events occur in between regular reports, a 
public company must report such events on a Form 8-K.153 Unicorns are not 
subject to these requirements, with most information about such companies 
therefore remaining undisclosed. Even well-known venture capitalists are voic-
ing their concerns about this lack of disclosure. Ben Horowitz of Andreessen 
Horowitz, one of the top-tier venture capital firms, described the late-stage 
market as “completely unregulated” and called the limited nature of disclosure 
by high-valuation private companies “scary.”154 Another venture capitalist, 
Josh Burwick, managing partner at Sand Hill East Ventures, wrote: 
                                                                                                                           
 147 Id. at 20 n.31 (“The share-ownership minimum for receiving financial information is negotia-
ble, but is often set at the holdings of the smallest venture capital investor. It should be set high 
enough to avoid burdensome disclosure requirements on the Company, but low enough to provide 
investors with information if they really need it.”). 
 148 See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 149 Of course, the right to observe is tempered by certain restrictions. For example, the company 
can withhold information or exclude an observer from portions of meetings to the extent that his or 
her presence would adversely affect attorney-client privilege between the company and its counsel or 
lead to the disclosure of trade secrets or a conflict of interest, or if the board observer is a competitor 
to the company. The parameters of board observer rights would be set forth in an investors’ rights 
agreement. See, e.g., MODEL IRA, supra note 87, at 22–23 (discussing disclosure). 
 150 See EDGAR: Search Tools, supra note 98. 
 151 See Form 10-Q, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-q.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2SEF-EVHA]. 
 152 See Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V9Z6-TY3Z]. 
 153 See Form 8-K, Current Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J534-V28R]. 
 154 Maureen Farrell, Slack’s Story Justifies Sky-High Tech Valuations, Ben Horowitz Says, WALL 
STREET J.: MONEY BEAT (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/29/
slacks-story-justifies-sky-high-tech-valuations-ben-horowitz-says/ [https://perma.cc/U38J-NW2B]. 
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Public companies are being held to a higher standard than their pri-
vate company peers, which has always been the case, but now that 
valuations are comparable it no longer makes sense. It’s as if the 
private companies have “tested out” of the due diligence of their 
peers and are being held to an honor system to divulge metrics as 
they see fit.155 
There are those in the legal academy who argue that increased disclosure, 
in and of itself, is not sufficient in the complex world in which we live.156 On 
the other end of the spectrum, too much disclosure can cause information over-
load.157 Scholars have offered a number of strategies to address some of the 
disclosure issues, such as a consumer-protection approach that focuses on the 
behavioral implications of disclosure.158 Others propose a tiered system of dis-
                                                                                                                           
 155 Josh Burwick, Should Private Cos. with Large Valuations Have to Disclose Metrics?, PITCH-
BOOK DATA, INC. (May 12, 2015), http://blog.pitchbook.com/should-private-cos-with-large-valuations-
have-to-disclose-metrics/ [https://perma.cc/MUY4-YCMX]. 
 156 Steven Schwarcz argues that, “[F]ull disclosure of structured transactions does not, as a practi-
cal matter, provide investors in the originator’s securities with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the 
merits of an investment. Moreover, most investors do not have the ability to evaluate structured trans-
actions.” Schwarcz, supra note 101, at 12. Similarly, Steven Davidoff and Claire Hill assert that 
disclosure is too often a convenient path for policymakers and many others looking to 
take action and hold onto comforting beliefs in the face of a bad outcome. Disclosure’s 
limits reveal yet again the need for a better understanding of the relationship between 
information processing and decisionmaking and more broadly, for a more nuanced view 
of human nature that can better inform policy decisions. 
Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 604 (2013); 
see also Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 421, 
423 (2012) (“[D]isclosure about securities and transactions in securities must relate not to the nature 
of the securities, but to the reliability of the intermediaries and the innovators that produce these secu-
rities—whoever produces them.”); Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the 
Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (using principles of behavioral psychology to 
argue that disclosure is inadequate as a default remedy). 
 157 Troy Paredes argues: 
Two things are needed for the federal securities laws, or any disclosure-based regulato-
ry regime, to be effective. The first is straightforward: information has to be disclosed. 
The second is equally straightforward, but often overlooked. That is, the users of the in-
formation—for example, investors, securities analysts, brokers, and money managers—
need to use the disclosed information effectively. 
Paredes, supra note 102, at 418. Paredes further notes that information overload can negatively impact 
decisionmaking. See id. at 419. 
 158 Henry Hu examines depictions of the risk-return characteristics of asset-backed securities and 
proposes “a disclosure paradigm that relies on both the intermediary depiction model [the model used 
by the SEC, in which corporations act as an ‘intermediary’ in transmitting a depiction of the objective 
reality to investors] and the pure information model [in which investors directly access the objective 
reality].” Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1610 (2012); see also Joseph A. Franco, A Consumer 
Protection Approach to Mutual Fund Disclosure and the Limits of Simplification, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. 
& FIN. 1, 9 (2009) (“A consumer-protection orientation to disclosure, by emphasizing the behavioral 
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closure for companies.159 There are also scholars who propose fixes to the in-
formation asymmetry in the disclosure regime.160 The present proposal of en-
hanced disclosure for the unicorn dilemma, detailed below, does not claim to 
be a panacea. Rather, it is a starting point for a larger discussion about the type 
and quality of information that should be disclosed, the presentation of that 
disclosure, and the manner in which it is disclosed. 
B. Recommended Disclosures for Unicorns 
This Article now turns to the question of what type of metrics unicorns 
should divulge. There are good reasons for a private company to remain in 
stealth mode, such as the need to develop new products that will revolutionize 
the particular ways we have done things (e.g., Uber’s disruption of the taxi 
industry) before bringing the product to market. At the point where valuations 
of private companies are as large or larger than most public companies, how-
ever, the company has already amassed a great deal of capital and is essentially 
not regulated by anyone, save for its major investors and its board. In fact, in 
many cases, the founders of the company exercise significant control.161 
As this Article points out in Part I above, the terms of private invest-
ments—which may inflate the reported valuations of unicorns—are often un-
disclosed.162 Unfortunately, unlike the major investors, both stockholders and 
                                                                                                                           
implications of disclosure, provides definite and concrete policy guidance in the design of mutual fund 
disclosure that differs from the SEC’s prospectus-centric approach.”). 
 159 See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the 
Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 156 (2013) (arguing for 
three categories of federal periodic disclosure requirements); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert 
B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 337, 342 (2013) (suggesting a two-tier system for disclosure obligations under contemporary 
securities regulation to “ease the costs associated with transition from private to public company”: one 
for smaller companies and the other “reserved for companies with a larger societal footprint”). But cf. 
Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 533 (2012) (arguing for a 
“lifecycle” approach in regulating the secondary markets). 
 160 See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 
182–83 (2012) (examining various information issues in the context of secondary markets and sug-
gesting minimum information requirements as well as looking at accredited investor status from a 
threshold perspective); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Laws’ Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3389, 3427–34 (2013) (looking at the secondary markets and contrasting the access of wealthy inves-
tors versus the “little guy” in such markets, and proposing access to the private markets through mutu-
al fund investment). 
 161 See infra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that some unicorns have two 
classes of common stock, one of which is entitled to ten votes for each share held by the holder of 
such common stock—typically, the Class B common stock). 
 162 One report states: 
[T]he reported valuations of many unicorns have been inflated by the terms of the pri-
vate investments that set those valuations before any initial public offerings of stock—
often with little or no disclosure of those terms. Increasingly, venture investors say, 
late-stage financing terms include extra protections, like a discount to the price of any 
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employees of the unicorns (who may or may not be stockholders depending on 
whether they have exercised their options) remain in the dark about such 
terms. Likewise, they do not understand the often-complex restated certificate 
of incorporation because it is neither readily accessible nor easily understood. 
To remedy this problem, the SEC should require unicorns to post their restated 
certificate of incorporation on both the SEC website and the unicorn’s website. 
In addition, unicorns should be required to highlight the key terms of the re-
stated certificate of incorporation on the Form D filings in layperson’s lan-
guage and provide relevant information about the company (such as the num-
ber of employees).  
Lastly, the financial information that generally is only available to major 
investors should be made available to all stockholders and employees via the 
unicorn’s website. These statements should be furnished on a regular basis, 
perhaps quarterly. Although major investors (who are always accredited inves-
tors) already receive the benefit of additional financial information as part of 
the contractual arrangement in the investors’ rights agreement,163 the unaccred-
ited investors and accredited investors who do not fall under the definition of 
“Major Investor” (all of whom are typically smaller equity holders in the issu-
er) do not have access to this type of information. Both of these groups of in-
vestors should have better visibility into the financial state of the company. In 
particular, this information may be important to rank-and-file employees who 
become stockholders in the company as their shares vest. 
This Article recommends that companies be required to comply with the 
hybrid disclosure requirements within ninety days of closing a financing val-
ued at $1 billion or more, because ninety days is typically the amount of time 
allotted for closings that take place after the initial closing. If the valuation 
falls below the $1 billion threshold in a later round, then the hybrid disclosure 
would no longer apply. Although there may be additional costs associated with 
an additional disclosure regime, it would be minimal because most companies 
are already compiling the relevant information. For example, as mentioned 
previously, financial statements are already prepared on a quarterly basis for 
major investors. Summarizing the terms of the certificates of incorporation 
may be more time consuming, but most of the key terms are available in the 
term sheet. Although some may argue that hybrid disclosure may lead compa-
nies to reposition themselves to avoid new disclosure requirements, given the 
high premium placed on billion-dollar valuations, that seems unlikely. In fact, 
                                                                                                                           
eventual initial offering, a minimum return on investment or extra shares if the compa-
ny later raises money at a lower valuation. 
Randall Smith, Protections for Late Investors Can Inflate Start-up Valuations, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (June 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/business/dealbook/protections-for-
late-investors-can-inflate-start-up-valuations.html?mwrsm=Email [https://perma.cc/U7NE-W4YX]. 
 163 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text (discussing an Investors’ Rights Agreement). 
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hybrid disclosures may result in companies going public earlier and foregoing 
the mega-funding rounds described in Part IV below.164 
In 1964, Congress added section 12(g)(1) to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) “[t]o extend to investors in certain over-the-
counter securities the same protection now afforded to those in listed securities 
by providing that the issuers of certain securities now traded over the counter 
shall be subject to the same requirements that now apply to issuers of securities 
listed on an exchange.”165 Prior to the 2012 amendment of section 12(g) of the 
Exchange Act, a company was required to register a class of equity securities 
with the SEC within 120 days after the end of its fiscal year if, on the last day 
of the company’s fiscal year, there were 500 or more recordholders of such 
class of securities and the company had assets totaling more than $10 mil-
lion.166 Title V of the JOBS Act amended section 12(g)(1)(A) of the Exchange 
Act and kept the total assets requirement the same ($10 million), but provided 
that a company would become subject to Exchange Act requirements within 
120 days after the last day of its first fiscal year where it met the asset thresh-
old and had a class of equity securities (other than exempted securities) held of 
record by either: (i) 2000 persons or (ii) 500 persons who are not accredited 
investors.167 
Under the newly revised section 12(g), private companies will not unin-
tentionally go public (as was the case for Google). Therefore, we are faced 
with a conundrum: the disclosures currently required of private companies are 
inadequate for unicorns, but the disclosures required of public companies are 
too burdensome. To resolve this issue, a hybrid approach is necessary to fill the 
information gap and give unicorns the increased attention that they merit in 
light of their enormous impact. To this end, this Article suggests that once a 
company reaches a valuation of $1 billion or more it should be subject to the 
enhanced disclosure requirements detailed above. The narrative that accompa-
nies financial disclosures would demystify a unicorn’s strategy and inform 
stockholders of the attendant risks and benefits of entering different markets 
and their impact on local economies. Otherwise, we are left in a world where 
the experience of employees at Square and Good Technology will remain 
commonplace. 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See infra notes 322–323 and accompanying text (discussing mega-funding rounds).  
 165 H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 1 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027. 
 166 15 U.S.C. § 78l (g)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). In 2004, Google filed a Form 10 and a Form S-1 for its 
IPO because it had exceeded the asset and stockholder threshold set forth in section 12(g) of the Ex-
change Act. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2011), http://hblr.org/?p=1028 [https://perma.cc/7WR3-MUF3]. 
 167 15 U.S.C. § 78l (g)(1)(A) (2012). Note that pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, “held 
of record” does not include securities held by persons who received the securities pursuant to an em-
ployee compensation plan in transactions exempt from the registration requirements under section 5 of 
the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1(a) (2015). 
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III. FIVE CASE STUDIES OF UNICORNS 
Part III examines five private companies—Airbnb, Dropbox, Pinterest, 
Snapchat, and Uber—that have reached, and in fact surpassed, unicorn sta-
tus.168 These companies are all household names, even among those who are 
not familiar with the technology industry. Each of these companies illustrates 
the startling dearth of information required of private companies in Form D 
filings and the information and power asymmetry that exists between major 
stockholders—who are typically the lead investors in a particular round of fi-
nancing—and all other stockholders.169 Although anyone can obtain a corpora-
tion’s certificate of incorporation from the Secretary of State of Delaware,170 
there is a fee,171 and the certificate of incorporation does not include significant 
information about the company. This Article argues that Form D should be 
revised to include more specific information about board composition, the 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See infra notes 174–321 and accompanying text. 
 169 Fenwick & West LLP recently analyzed the terms of thirty-seven U.S.-based venture-backed 
companies that achieved unicorn status in the twelve months ending March 31, 2015; none of the 
companies analyzed were named. The report stated its findings as follows: 
• Investors received terms that provided a fair amount of downside protection for 
their investment, especially in the event of an acquisition, but relatively few up-
side benefits. 
• These terms could result in a divergence in interest between early and late stage 
investors at the time of a liquidity event. 
• A significant percentage of the highest valuation unicorns had dual class com-
mon stock which provided founders/management and in some cases other share-
holders with super voting rights. 
• Attaining a unicorn valuation appears to be a goal of promising companies rais-
ing money, as 35% of the companies we analyzed had valuations in the $1–1.1 
billion dollar range, indicating that the companies may have negotiated specifi-
cally to attain the unicorn level. 
BARRY J. KRAMER & NICOLE HARPER, FENWICK & WEST LLP, THE TERMS BEHIND THE UNICORN 
VALUATIONS AS OF MARCH 31, 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/The-
Terms-Behind-The-Unicorn-Valuations.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPG4-TNJM] [hereinafter MARCH 2015 
TERMS]. A subsequent study completed over a nine-month period ending December 31, 2015, yielded 
similar results. The main difference noted by the study was the increase in unicorn financings, despite the 
shorter duration. See BARRY J. KRAMER ET AL., FENWICK & WEST LLP, THE TERMS BEHIND UNICORN 
VALUATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/
The-Terms-Behind-the-Unicorn-Valuations-As-of-December-31-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/M225-
BKEE]. A significant amount of the activity, however, occurred at the beginning, with a marked decline 
in the fourth quarter coupled with significantly more investor-friendly terms, such as increases in senior 
liquidation preferences, IPO protection terms (such as downside protection and premium on the unicorn 
price), and upside benefits. The per-share price for unicorn financings was fifty-seven times higher than 
such company’s per-share price for its Series A financing. MARCH 2015 TERMS, supra, at 1–2. 
 170 This information is specific to the State of Delaware, due to the fact that Delaware is a com-
mon state of incorporation, known for its well-defined corporate law and efficiency. See FELD & 
MENDELSON, supra note 3, at 170. 
 171 As an example, the author paid a copy fee for the Airbnb Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
in the amount of $62, plus an additional $20 to expedite processing, for a total of $82. 
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original share purchase price, protective provisions, voting arrangements, and 
the like in layperson’s terms.172 Furthermore, the revised Form D should be 
coupled with periodic financial information and both should be included on the 
unicorn’s website.173 
A. Airbnb 
1. Overview of Airbnb 
Airbnb is a home-sharing company that was incorporated in 2008 in the 
State of Delaware.174 In a few short years it has gone from just another startup 
to media darling.175 In 2015, the company was valued at $25.5 billion.176 
Anonymous sources have told The Wall Street Journal that Airbnb informed 
investors that it is on course to exceed $900 million in revenue in 2015177 (up 
from $850 million as predicted earlier).178 In 2013, it earned one-third of that 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See infra note 321 and accompanying text (suggesting revisions to Form D requirements). 
 173 In the event that a unicorn relies on section 4(a)(2) instead of Regulation D, then the infor-
mation required on a Form D (of which section 4(a)(2) does not have an equivalent) should be re-
quired of a company relying on such section. This Article argues that the information should be made 
available on the company’s website. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012); supra notes 161–167 and accompa-
nying text. 
 174 The company was formerly called Airbed & Breakfast, Inc. See Airbnb, Inc., Notice of Ex-
empt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Dec. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Airbnb Form D], http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1559720/000116840415000029/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://
perma.cc/5PRX-U4EQ]. Like the other unicorns discussed in Part III, Airbnb continues to innovate. It 
recently unveiled a price suggestion engine to help homeowners decide how much they should charge 
per night for a stay in their home. See Ellen Huet, How Airbnb Uses Big Data and Machine Learning 
to Guide Hosts to the Perfect Price, FORBES (June 5, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/
20160214153055/http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/06/05/how-airbnb-uses-big-data-and-
machine-learning-to-guide-hosts-to-the-perfect-price/#3064370a379e. 
 175 Just as Uber has disrupted the transportation industry, Airbnb has disrupted the vacation rental 
market: 
Over the past few years, the sharing economy has matured from a fringe movement into 
a legitimate economic force, with companies like Airbnb and Uber the constant subject 
of IPO rumors. . . . No less an authority than New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman has declared this the age of the sharing economy, which is “producing both 
new entrepreneurs and a new concept of ownership.” 
Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/ [https://perma.cc/G88V-NYTN]. 
 176 Sara Ashley O’Brien, ‘Crazy Money’—Airbnb Valued at Over $25 Billion, CNN MONEY 
(June 27, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/27/technology/airbnb-funding-valuation-
update/ [https://perma.cc/NT83-NBVU]. 
 177 Telis Demos, Airbnb Raises $1.5 Billion in One of Largest Private Placements, WALL STREET 
J. (June 26, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-1-5-billion-in-one-of-largest-
private-placements-1435363506 [https://perma.cc/ZCL2-BZ2N]. 
 178 Jillian D’Onfro, Airbnb Reportedly Is Raising Another $1 Billion, INC. (June 18, 2015), http://
www.inc.com/business-insider/airbnb-closing-new-round-of-valuation.html [https://perma.cc/EA63-
62MH]. 
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amount—$250 million.179 Airbnb further claims that by 2020, its annual reve-
nue will be $10 billion and that, by then, it will be profitable.180 Yet, for the 
time being, “the company is burning cash to expand, and forecasts an operat-
ing loss of about $150 million [for 2015].”181 Airbnb reportedly has 600 em-
ployees.182 
If Airbnb were a public company, the information above regarding reve-
nue, operating loss, and number of employees would be readily available to the 
public and verified by the company’s accountants. Because the information 
reported above came from scouring the Internet and was not supported by ac-
tual financial statements, however, the accuracy of the numbers cannot be as-
certained. 
2. Airbnb Form D 
In a recent Form D filing, Airbnb reported that it was relying on Rule 
506(c) of Regulation D for the offering and had 115 investors, none of whom 
were unaccredited.183 The amount of the offering and the total amount of secu-
rities sold was nearly $1.5 billion.184 As is the case with most companies when 
filing Form D, Airbnb declined to disclose its size (i.e., revenue). As evidenced 
by Airbnb’s Form D, the information it requires is very limited and therefore 
does not provide helpful data points for minority stockholders who lack access 
to the type of information major investors typically receive. 
3. Airbnb Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
Airbnb’s Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Airbnb Restated Certifi-
cate”) provides insight into the control dynamics among the company and its 
investors and founders.185 It also illustrates the power asymmetry between the 
major investors and smaller stockholders. Airbnb authorized 658,000,000 
shares of Common Stock, of which half were designated as Class A Common 
Stock and the other half as Class B Common Stock.186 Airbnb also authorized 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See Demos, supra note 177. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb’s $24 Billion Valuation, 
WALL STREET J. (June 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-math-of-airbnbs-
24-billion-valuation-1434568517 [https://perma.cc/7YTC-JZGW]. 
 182 See Airbnb, WORLD ECON. F., http://reports.weforum.org/technology-pioneers-2014/company-
profiles/airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/2XAS-MJC4]. Note that the site does not state the date on which the 
employee number was ascertained. 
 183 Airbnb Form D, supra note 174; see supra notes 19–44 and accompanying text (discussing 
exempt offerings). 
 184 Airbnb Form D, supra note 174. 
 185 See Airbnb, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation (July 13, 2015) [hereinafter Airbnb 
Restated COI] (on file with author). 
 186 See id. at 1. 
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114,053,168 shares of Preferred Stock, which are designated as Series Seed 
Preferred Stock, Series A Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, Series B-1 
Preferred Stock, Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, and Series 
E Preferred Stock.187 Under the Airbnb Restated Certificate, each holder of 
Class A Common Stock is entitled to one vote for each share of Class A Com-
mon Stock, and each holder of Class B Common Stock is entitled to ten votes 
for each share of Class B Common Stock.188 
Before any payment may be made to the holders of Common Stock, the 
holders of Preferred Stock have a liquidation preference: the greater of 
(1) their respective original issue price, plus any dividends declared but un-
paid, or (2) the amount per share that would be payable if all shares of Pre-
ferred Stock had been converted into Common Stock under the “Right to Con-
vert” provision in the Airbnb Restated Certificate immediately prior to such 
liquidation, dissolution, or winding up or Deemed Liquidation Event (as de-
fined in the Airbnb Restated Certificate).189 The holders of shares of Common 
Stock will then get their pro rata shares of the remaining assets.190 Essentially, 
this means that unless minority stockholders were holders of Preferred Stock, 
their liquidation preference would be paid after the holders of Preferred Stock 
(and only if there was anything remaining). 
Regarding the election of directors, the holders of Airbnb Series Seed Pre-
ferred Stock are entitled to elect one director, the holders of Series B and B-1 
Preferred Stock are entitled to elect one director; the holders of Common Stock 
are entitled to elect three directors; and the holders of Common Stock and eve-
ry other class or series of voting stock, including the Preferred Stock, are enti-
tled to elect the balance of the total number of directors of Airbnb on an as-
                                                                                                                           
 187 Id. at 1–2. Airbnb’s Preferred Stock is divided as follows: (1) 31,827,492 shares of Series 
Seed Preferred Stock, with an original issue price of $0.01932292 per share; (2) 17,197,416 shares of 
Series A Preferred Stock at $0.41866667 per share; (3) 17,351,343 shares of Series B Preferred Stock 
at $6.62483333 per share; (4) 951,840 shares of Series B-1 Preferred Stock at $2.20828 per share; (5) 
16,960,077 shares of Series C Preferred Stock at $11.7924 per share; (6) 12,765,000 shares of Series 
D Preferred Stock at $40.71303333 per share; and (7) 17,000,000 shares of Series E Preferred Stock at 
$93.0944 per share. See id. at 1–2, 5. 
 188 See id. at 2. Interestingly, the Airbnb Restated Certificate also provides that each outstanding 
share of Class B Common Stock will automatically convert into one share of Class A Common Stock 
upon the earlier of the vote or written consent of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding 
shares of Class B Common Stock at the time of such vote and upon the twentieth anniversary of the con-
summation of an IPO. Id. at 3. This type of voting structure is similar to the dual-voting structure that has 
become popular among companies that go public. See e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class 
Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012, 9:17 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control/?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/PU6C-ATGV] (listing Google and Facebook as examples). Under this structure, the 
founders retain a significant degree of control because they are typically the largest holders of com-
mon stock in a company. 
 189 See Airbnb Restated COI, supra note 185, at 5. 
 190 See id. 
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converted to Class B Common Stock basis (“Remaining Directors”).191 The 
voting structure indicates that the majority holders of each of the Series Pre-
ferred Stock, Series B and Series B-1 Preferred Stock, and Common Stock 
have greater influence than the rank-and-file holders of Preferred Stock be-
cause they can choose the members of the board and, as a result, have access to 
more information than a smaller stockholder of Preferred Stock. The Remain-
ing Directors are voted on an as-converted to Class B Common Stock basis, 
which means that each holder gets ten votes for each share of stock that he or 
she holds. Put differently, the founders of Airbnb, who undoubtedly have the 
largest holdings of Class B Common Stock, control the Common Stock seats 
and have a significant voice in electing the Remaining Directors. The minority 
stockholders therefore effectively have no voice in determining board compo-
sition. 
As one might expect, there are extensive Preferred Stock protective pro-
visions as well, both on a class basis and series preferred basis.192 For each 
series of Preferred Stock, with the exception of Series B and Series B-1 Pre-
ferred Stock (which vote together) and Series D Preferred Stock (which re-
quires that 66 and 2/3% of the then outstanding shares of Series D Preferred 
Stock must consent), a majority of the then-outstanding shares of each particu-
lar Series Preferred must consent before the rights, preferences, privileges, and 
restrictions of that particular Series Preferred are altered, changed, or 
waived.193 Minority stockholders would only get the benefit of the protective 
provisions if they were holders of Preferred Stock, and even then, the major 
investors would control major decisions. 
The Airbnb Restated Certificate also sets forth that at the time of conver-
sion, each share of Preferred Stock will convert into Class B Common Stock, 
which in turn gives its holders greater voting rights—ten votes for each share 
of Class B Common Stock.194 The mandatory conversion will occur upon ei-
                                                                                                                           
 191 See id. at 7. In the case of each Series Preferred director, as long as 50% of the shares of Pre-
ferred Stock originally issued remain outstanding, that particular Series Preferred will retain the right 
to elect a director exclusively and vote as a separate class. See id. 
 192 See id. at 8–11. 
 193 See id. The Airbnb Restated Certificate, however, makes clear that the authorization or issu-
ance of any existing or new series of Preferred Stock by Airbnb would not be deemed to be an adverse 
alteration of, change in, or waiving of the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of that particu-
lar Series Preferred. See id. (specifying the class protective provisions and the protective provisions of 
each of the Series Preferred stock and stating that at least 50% of the shares of each Series Preferred 
originally issued under the applicable stock purchase agreement (except in the case of Series B and 
Series B-1 Preferred Stock which can meet the 50% threshold together) must remain outstanding in 
order for such Series Preferred’s protective provisions to remain in place). In the case of every Series 
Preferred except for the Series D Preferred Stock that requires a 66 and 2/3% vote, a majority vote is 
required if the rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions of such Series Preferred is altered, 
changed, or waived. See id.  
 194 See id. at 24. 
616 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:583 
ther (1) the closing of the sale of shares of Common Stock to the public in a 
firm-commitment underwritten public offering, which would result, at a mini-
mum, in $75 million of gross proceeds to Airbnb, or (2) the date and time, or 
the occurrence of an event, as consented to by the holders of at least a majority 
of the then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock.195 Put differently, the major 
investors would determine when the company would go public. Although mi-
nority stockholders could have life events—such as buying their first home and 
having their first child—that would affect their decision whether to take the 
company public (if they actually had a choice), major investors have no such 
constraints. Major investors can theoretically wait to go public (and achieve 
liquidity) at a much later date if it behooves them to do so. 
Interestingly, shares of Series D Preferred Stock held as of the original is-
sue date that were converted into Class B Common Stock pursuant to a Series 
D Conversion Agreement are not subject to antidilution adjustments.196 This 
would give the holders of Series D Preferred Stock greater voting rights, but 
not superior rights, preferences, and privileges in other instances, such as liq-
uidation preference. If a minority stockholder had invested in the Series D Pre-
ferred Stock round of financing, he or she would now have more votes, but 
would lose the rights, preferences, and privileges of holders of Preferred Stock. 
Pursuant to the preferred stock protective provisions under the class pro-
tective provisions section, holders of the majority of the then-outstanding 
shares of Preferred Stock must consent separately and together as a class on an 
as-converted-to-the-appropriate-class-of-Common-Stock basis in the event 
Airbnb redeems or repurchases any shares of Common Stock.197 This in itself 
is not unusual, because holders of Preferred Stock want to have the right to 
carefully control the capitalization of the company. What is atypical, however, 
is that this provision is not triggered as long as the aggregate amount of the 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See id. Upon a mandatory conversion, all outstanding shares of Preferred Stock would convert 
into shares of Class B Common Stock; however, the election of holders of a majority of the outstand-
ing shares of Series B Preferred Stock is required to automatically convert the outstanding shares of 
Series B Preferred Stock in connection with any Deemed Liquidation Event (as defined in the Airbnb 
Restated Certificate) in which holders of Series B Preferred Stock received (or would be reasonably 
expected to receive at the time of such conversion), an amount per share less than the Series B Pre-
ferred Stock Liquidation Amount. The same principle applies to the Series C Preferred Stock and 
Series D Preferred Stock, except that in the case of the latter, the vote would need to be at least 66 and 
2/3%. See id. at 24–25. In the case of Series E Preferred Stock, a majority of the outstanding shares of 
Series E Preferred Stock would be required to convert the outstanding shares of Series E Preferred 
Stock in connection with not only any Deemed Liquidation Event in which holders of Series E Pre-
ferred Stock receive at the closing of such transaction an amount per share less than the application 
Liquidation Amount (as defined in Airbnb Restated Certificate) of the Series E Preferred Stock, but 
also any equity financing of Airbnb in which the pre-financing valuation of the Company in such 
financing is $8,000,000,000 or more. See id. 
 196 See id. at 15. In contrast, there is a special antidilution adjustment for Series C Preferred 
Stock. See id. at 22–24. 
 197 See id. at 8–9. 
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repurchase does not exceed $100 million per calendar year.198 This provision 
has implications for employees who hold options or who are already stock-
holders, because it means that Airbnb could choose to repurchase up to $100 
million worth of employee options or shares without triggering the protective 
provision. Typically, such repurchases are done at a much lower value than the 
current value of the stock.199 This could have negative repercussions for the 
employees of unicorns, particularly if such employees foresee the stock in-
creasing in value. 
Under the terms of the antidilution carveouts, the board vote must include 
either the Series Seed Director or Series B Director to: (1) increase the number 
of shares reserved under any equity plan; and (2) approve shares of common 
stock, options, or convertible securities issued (i) to banks, equipment lessors, 
or financial institutions in connection with a debt financing or equipment leas-
ing transaction, and (ii) in connection with sponsored research, collaboration, 
technology license, development, OEM [original equipment manufacturing], 
marketing, or other similar agreements or strategic partnerships.200 According-
ly, the major holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock or Series B Preferred 
Stock have a higher degree of influence than the holders of Series A Preferred 
Stock, Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, and Series E Pre-
ferred Stock who do not have designated board members other than as part of a 
larger voting block of Common Stock and Preferred Stock, voting together. 
This particular section demonstrates the key roles the Series Seed Director and 
Series B Director play in the company decision-making process, because their 
votes are required in key matters affecting the company, including the size of 
the option pool. Minority stockholders and employees would most likely not 
be aware of this fact. 
Certain educated guesses can be made about the major stockholders of the 
company, such as the fact that the holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock and 
Series B Preferred Stock most likely have a major investor in each of those 
Series Preferred that controls a majority of the shares of the outstanding Series 
Seed Preferred Stock and Series B Preferred Stock, respectively. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See id. at 8. The shares repurchased refer to outstanding shares of common stock or options to 
purchase shares of Common Stock from employees or other service providers in connection with an 
employee liquidity or such similar program (as approved by the Board, or shares of Preferred Stock). 
The rest of the section on class protective provisions is fairly standard and requires a vote of the Pre-
ferred Stock if there is an increase or decrease of the authorized number of shares of Common Stock 
or Preferred Stock having a new class or series of equity securities having rights, preferences or privi-
leges senior to or on parity with any series of Preferred Stock, declaring or paying any dividend, 
changing the authorized number of Board members, liquidating Airbnb, or amending, altering, restat-
ing, waiving, or repealing any provision of the Restated Certificate that would adversely change the 
rights, preferences, and privileges of the Preferred Stock. See id. at 8–9. 
 199 See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text (discussing employee stock options). 
 200 See Airbnb Restated COI, supra note 185, at 14–15. 
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these major investors have significant information rights via the Amended and 
Restated Investors’ Rights Agreement in their capacity as board members. This 
example highlights the fact that the minority stockholders have very little in-
fluence, if any, about the direction of the company, because there are voting 
provisions that benefit the major stockholders when certain actions are taken 
by Airbnb. Additionally, because the minority stockholders lack the same ac-
cess to information that major stockholders have, they do not have any visibil-
ity into what is happening with the company. Lastly, based on the repurchase 
provision in the antidilution carveouts, one can surmise that Airbnb anticipates 
addressing employee liquidity issues through a repurchase program that does 
not trigger antidilution. 
B. Dropbox 
1. Overview of Dropbox 
Dropbox was incorporated in 2007 in the State of Delaware.201 It touts it-
self as a secure file sharing and cloud storage solution with an emphasis on 
providing these services for businesses.202 Since its inception, “it has added 
300 million new users across 200 countries”203 and was valued at $10 billion 
more than two years ago.204 Any information about the number of Dropbox 
users or employees can only be gleaned from news reports. And like the num-
bers reported for Airbnb, they cannot be verified. In one article from April 
2015, Dropbox reportedly had “over 1,200 employees—from about 500 a year 
ago—working on a platform used by more than 300 million users world-
                                                                                                                           
 201 See Dropbox, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Feb. 19, 2014) [herein-
after Dropbox Form D], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467623/000146762314000002/
xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://perma.cc/DKR3-H4UX]. Dropbox was originally known as 
Evenflow, Inc. Id. 
 202 See Dropbox Business, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/business [https://perma.cc/
H4CT-7KBP]. Note that the homepage does not reference cloud storage, but just storage. See id. 
Dropbox is now making inroads in the collaborative note-taking space as well. See Sarah Perez, 
Dropbox’s Collaborative Note-Taking Service, Dropbox Notes, Heads into Beta Testing, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 23, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/23/dropboxs-collaborative-note-taking-
service-dropbox-notes-heads-into-beta-testing/#.j6lqea:YCWc [https://perma.cc/QSC8-3SDM]. 
 203 Eugene Kim, The Clock Is Ticking for Dropbox, Valued at $10 Billion More Than a Year Ago, 
BUS. INSIDER (May 20, 2015, 7:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-clock-is-ticking-for-
dropbox-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/LJ85-DADG]. 
 204 See id. Despite its successes, however, there are indications that the company is struggling. 
See id. 
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wide.”205 In 2014, Dropbox was also rumored to have had revenue in the range 
of $300 million to $400 million; in 2013 it was said to be $200 million.206 
2. Dropbox Form D 
In its most recent Form D filing, filed on February 24, 2014, Dropbox re-
ported that seventy-two investors have invested in the offering, none of whom 
were unaccredited investors.207 The federal exemption Dropbox relied on was 
Rule 506(b) and the total offering amount was $450 million.208 Dropbox de-
clined to disclose its revenue range.209 
3. Dropbox Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
Similar to Airbnb, Dropbox has three classes of stock: Class A Common 
Stock, Class B Common Stock, and Preferred Stock.210 Under the Dropbox 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Dropbox Restated Certificate”), Drop-
box authorized a total of 1,526,661,381 shares of its capital stock, of which 
700,000,000 shares are Class A Common Stock, 600,000,000 shares are Class 
B Common Stock, and 226,661,381 shares are Preferred Stock.211 There are 
four series of Preferred Stock: Series A Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred 
Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, and Series C Preferred Stock.212 
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of Dropbox, the 
holders of each share of Preferred Stock then outstanding are entitled to be 
paid their respective original issue price per share (or pro rata amount if the 
full amount is not available) prior to the holders of Class A and Class B Com-
mon Stock. After the holders of Preferred Stock are paid their liquidation pref-
erence, the holders of Class A and Class B Common Stock will receive the re-
mainder based on their respective pro rata share.213 As is customary, the 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Eugene Kim, Why Dropbox Only Expects Its Employees to Hit 70% of Their Goals, BUS. IN-
SIDER (Apr. 16, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-dropbox-motivates-employees-
2015-4 [https://perma.cc/CZ4V-26SD]. 
 206 The Dropbox Valuation Is Irrational, CB INSIGHTS (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.
com/blog/dropbox-valuation-bubble/ [https://perma.cc/FHM8-FF7C]. 
 207 Dropbox Form D, supra note 201. 
 208 Id. Dropbox also hired Allen & Company LLC and the Goldman Sachs Group to help facili-
tate the deal, paying $8,125,000 in sales commissions. See id. 
 209 See id. 
 210 See Dropbox, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation, exhibit 1, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2014) [here-
inafter Dropbox Restated COI] (on file with author). 
 211 See id. 
 212 The Preferred Stock is designated as follows: (1) 95,810,910 shares of Series A Preferred 
Stock with an original issue price of $0.06263 per share; (2) 78,023,640 shares of Series A-1 Preferred 
Stock with an original issue price of $0.01605; (3) 29,268,103 shares of Series B Preferred Stock with 
an original issue price of $9.0491; and (4) 23,558,728 of Series C Preferred Stock with an original 
issue price of $19.1012 per share. See id. at 2–3. 
 213 See id. at 5–6. 
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deemed liquidation event is defined in the Dropbox Restated Certificate, unless 
otherwise approved by the vote of each of the following: (1) the holders of at 
least two-thirds of voting power of Preferred Stock then outstanding, as a sepa-
rate class; (2) the holders of at least seventy percent in voting power of the 
shares of Series B Preferred Stock then outstanding, as a separate series; and 
(3) the holders of a majority in voting power of the shares of Series C Pre-
ferred Stock then outstanding, as a separate series.214 In the case of Series B 
Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock, a majority of the shares of each 
such series originally issued must remain outstanding for such vote to be val-
id.215 If minority stockholders are holders of Preferred Stock, they have the 
superior liquidation preference given to such holders; however, it is unlikely 
that they have a say in the decision-making process when such liquidation 
event occurs. 
Similar to Airbnb, the Dropbox Restated Certificate states that each hold-
er of shares of Class A Common Stock is entitled to one vote for each share of 
such stock; in the case of Class B Common Stock, the holder of Class B 
Common Stock is entitled to ten votes for each share of such stock. Unlike 
Airbnb, however, Dropbox states that each share of Preferred Stock is entitled 
to ten votes for each share of Class B Common Stock into which the shares of 
Preferred Stock could be converted.216 The founders of Dropbox likely hold 
the Class B Common Stock, as it has superior voting rights to Class A Com-
mon Stock, which is most likely held by rank-and-file employees. Therefore, 
employees will have minimal influence on any actions that require a vote, giv-
en the founders’ voting power. 
Dropbox has authorized a five-member board of directors and the number 
of directors cannot be altered without the consent of the holders of at least a 
majority of the then-outstanding shares of (1) Preferred Stock, voting as a sep-
arate class; and (2) Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock, vot-
ing as a separate class.217 The holders of Preferred Stock, voting as a separate 
class, are entitled to elect one director (the “Dropbox Preferred Director”) and 
the holders of Class A Common Stock and Class B Common Stock are entitled 
to elect the remaining four.218 Again, because the holders of Class B Common 
Stock have ten votes for every share of such stock that they hold, they are ef-
fectively the stockholders who elect the remaining four directors. 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See id. at 6. 
 215 See id. 
 216 See id. at 8. 
 217 See id. at 9. 
 218 See id. The Board election assumes that at least 45,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock are out-
standing (as may be adjusted for additional stock splits, combinations, stock dividends, recapitaliza-
tions, reclassifications, and the like). 
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The class protective provisions specify that Dropbox must obtain the ap-
proval of a majority in voting power of the then-outstanding shares of Pre-
ferred Stock, voting as a single class, under certain circumstances.219 This Ar-
ticle focuses on the protective provisions regarding any redemption or repur-
chase of Class A Common Stock or Class B Common Stock. Not only does 
any redemption or repurchase of these classes require a majority vote of the 
then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, it also requires a seventy percent 
vote of the then-outstanding Series B Preferred Stock and a majority vote of 
the then-outstanding Series C Preferred Stock.220 One of the less common pro-
visions in the Dropbox Restated Certificate provides that Dropbox cannot ef-
fect a Liquidation Event (as defined in the Restated Certificate) in which each 
holder of Series A Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock, Series B Pre-
ferred Stock, or Series C Preferred Stock receives less than two times such 
holder’s original issue price per share without the approval of a majority of the 
then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock.221 Additionally, there are specific, 
separate protective provisions for Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Pre-
ferred Stock so long as a majority of the shares of these series originally issued 
remains outstanding, respectively.222 In the case of the Series B Preferred 
Stock, the approval of the holders of at least seventy percent in voting power 
of the then-outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock, voting together as a 
single class, is required for certain actions to take place;223 in the case of the 
Series C Preferred Stock, approval of the holders of at least a majority in vot-
ing power of the then-outstanding shares of Series C Preferred Stock, voting 
together as a single class, is required.224 The specific threshold levels of votes 
for the protective provisions are undoubtedly carefully calibrated to prevent 
                                                                                                                           
 219 Most of the class protective provisions are fairly standard. For example, Dropbox must obtain 
the approval of a majority of interest of the Preferred Stock then outstanding before it amends the 
Dropbox Restated Certificate or bylaws in a way that materially and adversely affects the rights, pref-
erences, privileges, or restrictions of the Preferred Stock. See id. at 22. 
 220 The redemption or repurchase excludes the repurchase by Dropbox of shares of Class A 
Common Stock or Class B Common Stock held by employees, officers, and others performing ser-
vices for Dropbox or a subsidiary that are subject to restricted stock purchase agreements, stock option 
exercise agreements, vesting agreements, or similar agreements under which Dropbox has the option 
to repurchase such shares at cost, upon the occurrence of certain events (e.g., termination of employ-
ment or services); or at a price pursuant to Dropbox’s exercise of right of first refusal to repurchase 
such shares (“Permitted Repurchases”) in the case of the Preferred Stock vote and “redemptions or 
repurchases (i) that are Permitted Repurchases or (ii) pursuant to [Dropbox’s] rights of first refusal,” 
in the case of the Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock votes. Id. at 22–23. Note that 
the definition of Permitted Repurchases covers Dropbox’s exercise of a right of first refusal to pur-
chase such shares although the right of first refusal is not specified as it is in the similar provision for 
the respective votes of the Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock. See id. at 3. 
 221 See id. at 22. 
 222 See id. at 22–23. 
 223 See id. at 22. 
 224 See id. at 23. 
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minority stockholders from having any influence over the decision-making 
process. 
The Dropbox Restated Certificate also specifies certain antidilution 
carveouts.225 In the event that any shares of Class A Common Stock, Class B 
Common Stock, or Preferred Stock226 issued or issuable after the applicable 
original issue date are approved by the board of directors, which includes the 
Dropbox Preferred Director, and are also approved by the holders of at least 
seventy percent in voting power of the then-outstanding shares of Series B Pre-
ferred Stock and a majority in voting power of then-outstanding shares of Se-
ries C Preferred Stock, such shares will not trigger the antidilution adjust-
ment.227 Furthermore, each such approval must specifically state that such 
shares shall be excluded from the definition of “Additional Shares” (which 
would ordinarily trigger the antidilution adjustment). 
The holders of at least a majority in voting power of the shares of Pre-
ferred Stock as a class or series of Preferred Stock then outstanding may waive 
any of the rights, powers, preferences, and other terms of either the Preferred 
Stock as a class or such series of Preferred Stock, provided that the holders of 
two-thirds in voting power of the Preferred Stock then outstanding is required 
when any rights of the holders of Preferred Stock are waived; seventy percent 
in voting power of the Series B Preferred Stock then outstanding is required 
when any rights of the Series B Preferred Stock are waived; and a majority in 
voting power of the Series C Preferred Stock then outstanding is required 
when any of the rights of the holders of Series C Preferred Stock are waived.228 
It is clear, based on the information provided in the Dropbox Restated 
Certificate, that the holders of Class A Common Stock, Class B Common 
Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, and Series C Preferred Stock are the im-
portant players in Dropbox. The Class A Common Stock and Class B Common 
Stock are most likely held by employees of the company and the founders, re-
spectively.229 The fact that the threshold level of separate approvals for the 
holders of Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock are seventy 
percent of the then-outstanding shares of Series B Preferred Stock and a major-
ity of the Series C Preferred Stock indicates that the majority stockholder(s) 
                                                                                                                           
 225 See id. at 13–15 (enumerating the antidilution carveouts under art. V, section 6.8(b)). 
 226 See id. at 15 (specifying in art. V, section 6.8(b)(i)(K), that options or warrants or rights to 
acquire Class A Common Stock, Class B Common Stock, or Preferred Stock are also included in the 
antidilution carveouts). 
 227 See Dropbox Restated COI, supra note 210, at 15. 
 228 See id. at 24. 
 229 The author makes this conclusion based on her own practice experience. Startups grant options 
to purchase common stock to their employees to entice them with the possibility of a huge upside 
when the company goes public. As the Class B Common Stock has ten votes for every one share, it is 
almost certainly held by the founders of Dropbox so that they can exert greater control over decisions 
that affect the future of Dropbox. 
2016] Regulating Unicorns 623 
most likely hold those respective amounts. Although the holders of Series A 
Preferred Stock and Series A-1 Preferred Stock do not have the right to block 
votes, as the Series B Preferred Stock and Series C Preferred Stock do, they 
still have some leverage because their vote is needed to effect any of the ac-
tions enumerated in the protective provisions. This has repercussions for the 
Amended and Restated Investors’ Rights Agreement; depending on who the 
investors are, there is a strong possibility that only the Dropbox Preferred Di-
rector and perhaps a board observer designee of Series C Preferred Stock have 
access to detailed information regarding the financials of Dropbox. Further-
more, the stringent repurchase provisions requiring three different types of 
votes ensure that employees are unlikely to be able to sell their shares on the 
secondary market. 
C. Pinterest 
1. Overview of Pinterest 
Pinterest was originally incorporated in 2008 in the State of Delaware un-
der the name Cold Brew Labs Inc.230 Pinterest began as a place to store imag-
es, but now aims to “become the search engine for discovery, or the place to go 
to when users are looking for new ideas.”231 Users of the service compile 
“pins” (photos and links that bookmark various sources) on personal, online 
“boards” dedicated to their interests.232 Since the site’s launch in 2010, the to-
tal number of pins has passed thirty billion.233 Pinterest recently struck ad deals 
with General Mills, Kraft, Lululemon, and Gap.234 In its last round of funding, 
the company was valued at $11 billion—more than twice its previous round.235 
Unlike Airbnb and Dropbox, reports of rumored revenue could not be found. 
The only relevant number that could be located was the number of employees, 
which was reportedly over 500.236 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See Pinterest, Inc., Eleventh Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (Feb. 27, 
2015) [hereinafter Pinterest Restated COI] (on file with author). 
 231 Yoree Koh, Pinterest Valued at $11 Billion After Latest Funding, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 16, 
2015, 5:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/pinterest-raises-367-million-at-11-billion-valuation-
1426538379 [https://perma.cc/8T6F-SXDN]. 
 232 What’s Pinterest?, PINTEREST, https://web.archive.org/web/20150910044755/https://business.
pinterest.com/en/whats-pinterest. 
 233 Douglas MacMillan, Pinterest Is Now Valued at $5 Billion, Despite Little Revenue, WALL 
STREET. J.: DIGITS (May 15, 2014, 7:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/15/pinterest-is-
now-valued-at-5-billion-despite-almost-no-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/36FR-EYBJ]. 
 234 See id. Each of these companies paid for up to three- to six-month commitments at a price of 
$1–2 million. Id. 
 235 See Koh, supra note 231. 
 236 Press, PINTEREST, https://about.pinterest.com/en/press [https://perma.cc/98PW-U4FB]. A 
thorough Internet search was done to attempt to find relevant financial information. 
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2. Pinterest Form D 
In its most recent Form D filing, filed on March 16, 2015, Pinterest re-
ported that fifteen investors participated in the offering, none of whom were 
unaccredited investors.237 This figure, however, only reflects the number of 
investors in the offering—there is no information about who these investors 
are, nor is there any indication of how much each of them invested. 
The federal exemption Pinterest relied on was Rule 506(b) and the total 
offering amount was $577,916,906, of which $367,099,927 was sold in the 
initial closing.238 Pinterest declined to disclose its revenue range.239 
3. Pinterest Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
Pinterest’s Eleventh Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
(“Pinterest Restated Certificate”) was filed with the Delaware Secretary of 
State on February 27, 2015.240 It authorized 340,000,000 shares of Common 
Stock and 181,556,318 shares of Preferred Stock.241 The Preferred Stock is 
respectively designated as Seed 1 Preferred Stock, Seed 2 Preferred Stock, Se-
ries A-1 Preferred Stock, Series A-2 Preferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, 
Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, 
Series F Preferred Stock, and Series G Preferred Stock.242 Unlike Airbnb and 
Dropbox, Pinterest does not have two classes of Common Stock; however, it 
does have significantly more series of Preferred Stock, with two seed rounds 
and eight preferred stock financing rounds.243 
The holders of Series B Preferred Stock are entitled to elect one director 
of Pinterest (the “Pinterest Series B Director”), exclusively and as a separate 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Pinterest, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Mar. 16, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1506293/000150629315000001/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml 
[https://perma.cc/6NUC-JYRB]. 
 238 See id. 
 239 See id. 
 240 Pinterest Restated COI, supra note 230, at 1. 
 241 See id. exhibit A, at 1. 
 242 The Preferred Stock is designated as follows with the following original issue prices: (1) 
24,645,000 shares of Seed 1 Preferred Stock at $0.02 per share; (2) 19,713,850 shares of Seed 2 Pre-
ferred Stock at $0.0454 per share; (3) 2,852,500 Series A-1 Preferred Stock at $0.1928 per share; (4) 
36,963,415 shares of Series A-2 Preferred Stock at $0.28328 per share; (5) 22,663,350 shares of Se-
ries B Preferred Stock at $1.195966 per share; (6) 12,855,850 shares of Series C Preferred Stock at 
$7.77856 per share; (7) 18,502,932 shares of Series D Preferred Stock at $10.8091 per share; (8) 
15,484,454 shares of Series E Preferred Stock at $14.5307 per share; (9) 11,774,967 shares of Series F 
Preferred Stock at $16.98518 per share; and (10) 16,100,000 shares of Series G Preferred Stock at 
$35.89546 per share. See id. at 1–3. 
 243 See id. at 1. 
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series.244 Likewise, the holders of Series A-1 and A-2 Preferred Stock, voting 
together, exclusively and as a separate class and on an as-converted basis, are 
entitled to elect one director (the “Pinterest Series A Director”).245 The holders 
of Common Stock are entitled to elect two directors (the “Pinterest Common 
Directors”), exclusively and as a separate class.246 The holders of the Common 
Stock and Preferred Stock vote on the balance of the total number of directors, 
together as a single class and on an as-converted basis.247 Based on the Pre-
ferred Stock protective provisions, the authorized number of directors is 
four.248 Individually, minority stockholders do not have enough votes to impact 
the outcome for the Pinterest Common Directors in any meaningful way. Addi-
tionally, they will not have access to information that board members receive 
in their capacity as such. 
One of the unusual provisions in the Pinterest Restated Certificate is the 
fact that Ben Silbermann, the President and CEO, is entitled to three votes in 
his capacity as a member of the Board of Directors (the “Special Director 
Vote”), but such right is not applicable to matters relating to his compensa-
tion.249 Furthermore, if the two Pinterest Common Director seats are occupied, 
Mr. Silbermann’s Special Director Vote is reduced to two votes.250 Although 
there is only one class of Common Stock, as one of the co-founders of Pinter-
est, Mr. Silbermann exercises a significant degree of influence over Pinterest 
through the Special Director Vote.251 It would be important for investors in 
Pinterest to have access to this information to accurately understand the power 
dynamics within the company and the degree of the CEO’s influence. 
Under the Preferred Stock protective provisions, the approval of sixty 
percent of then-outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, voting together as a sin-
gle class on an as-converted basis, is required under certain enumerated cir-
cumstances.252 Unlike Airbnb and Dropbox, Pinterest’s class protective provi-
sions regarding the purchase, redemption, payment, or declaration of any divi-
                                                                                                                           
 244 Id. at 7. At least 11,331,675 shares of Series B Preferred Stock, subject to adjustment in the 
event of any stock dividend, stock split, combination or the like, must remain outstanding in order to 
retain the right to elect the Pinterest Series B Director. See id. 
 245 See id. At least 19,907,955 shares of Series A-1 Preferred Stock and/or Series A-2 Preferred 
Stock, subject to adjustment in the event of any stock dividend, stock split, combination or the like, 
must remain outstanding in order to retain the right to elect the Pinterest Series A Director. See id. 
 246 See Pinterest Restated COI, supra note 230, exhibit A, at 7. 
 247 See id. 
 248 See id. at 8. Having an even number of board members is unusual as companies typically want 
an odd number in the event of a tie; that being said, the Special Director Vote would effectively make 
it an odd vote. See id. at 7–8. 
 249 See id. 
 250 See id. at 8. 
 251 See Nicholas Carlson, Pinterest CEO: Here’s How We Became the Web’s Next Big Thing 
(DECK), BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/pinterest-founding-
story-2012-4 [https://perma.cc/9E9J-TDL2] (describing Ben Silbermann’s role in founding Pinterest). 
 252 Pinterest Restated COI, supra note 230, exhibit A, at 8. 
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dend or distribution on any shares of capital stock of Pinterest excludes the 
“repurchases of stock from former employees, officers, directors, consultants 
or other persons who performed services for [Pinterest] . . . in connection with 
the cessation of such employment or service, at the lower of the original pur-
chase price or the then-current fair market value thereof” pursuant to board 
approval.253 The Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, Series F 
Preferred Stock, and Series G Preferred Stock also have separate series protec-
tive provisions.254  
In the case of each of the aforementioned series of Preferred Stock, as 
long as approximately twenty-five percent of the originally issued shares of 
each series remains outstanding, Pinterest cannot take any action to: (1) amend 
the Pinterest Restated Certificate or bylaws which would alter the rights, pref-
erences, powers, or special rights of the particular series of Preferred Stock 
without similarly affecting the entire class of Preferred Stock; or (2) issue or 
obligate itself to issue more than the number of that series of Preferred Stock 
specified in the Restated Certificate as the authorized number for that series of 
Preferred Stock.255 As in the vast majority of venture capital financings, the 
voting thresholds are drafted in such a way that the control of the Preferred 
Stock, voting as a class, or a particular series of Preferred Stock, voting as a 
separate series, remains in the hands of the major investors. Again, having this 
kind of information available in a Form D would be helpful in giving different 
types of stockholders a clearer picture of the voting structure of the organiza-
tion and whether voting blocks are possible. 
The Pinterest Restated Certificate also provides for mandatory conversion 
of Preferred Stock to Common Stock in the event of either (1) the closing of 
the sale of shares of Common Stock to the public in a firm commitment un-
derwritten public offering amounting to at least $50 million of gross proceeds 
to Pinterest (the “Pinterest Qualified IPO”); or (2) such date, time, or particular 
event specified by the holders of at least sixty percent of the the-outstanding 
shares of Preferred Stock, voting together as a single class on an as-converted 
basis.256 If, however, the mandatory conversion is a “Deemed Liquidation 
Event” as that term is defined in the Pinterest Restated Certificate under sce-
nario (2) above, then Pinterest must also have the approval of the holders of 
the majority of Series B Preferred Stock, Series C Preferred Stock, Series D 
Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, Series F Preferred Stock, and Series 
G Preferred Stock, each voting as a separate class (and not together).257 There 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See id. at 8. 
 254 See id. at 9–10. 
 255 See id. The Series D Preferred Stock protective provision has a 60% threshold for its approval, 
whereas the Series E, F, and G Preferred Stock have a majority threshold. See id. 
 256 See id. at 21–22. 
 257 See id. at 22. 
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is also a redemption provision in the Pinterest Restated Certificate.258 Both the 
mandatory conversion and redemption provisions illustrate yet again the power 
of the major investors in the event of a Deemed Liquidation Event or a re-
demption. 
D. Snapchat 
1. Overview of Snapchat 
Snapchat was incorporated in 2012 in the State of Delaware.259 Valued at 
$16 billion, Snapchat is a messaging app company known as a platform for 
“selfies” and videos that quickly disappear after the receiver has viewed 
them.260 Like the other companies discussed in this Article, it continues to ex-
pand its reach.261 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See id. at 23. A redemption right gives investors the right to have their shares redeemed by a 
company on a particular date; in the case of Pinterest, the holders of at least 72% of the Preferred 
Stock, voting together as a single class on an as-converted basis, can request such redemption any 
time on or after February 27, 2025. See id.; see also MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 33 n.60 (noting 
that redemption provisions are not more typical of East Coast than West Coast venture capital fi-
nancings). 
However, in the wake of the Delaware Chancery Court’s 2009 opinion in [In] re Trados 
Inc. S’holder Litigation, . . . investors may be foregoing a substantial protection/benefit 
if they do not have the right to put their shares back to the company at a time when they 
may wish to seek the sale of the company. 
See MODEL COI, supra note 72, at 33 n.60 (citing In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 39 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2013)). 
 259 Snapchat, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (May 28, 2015) [hereinafter 
Snapchat Form D], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1564408/000163845415000002/xsl
FormDX01/primary_doc.xml [https://perma.cc/3DCN-LMZE]. 
 260 Snapchat was valued at $16 billion during its last round of funding. See Leslie Picker & Sarah 
Frier, Snapchat Said to Be Valued at $16 Billion in New Fundraising, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 29, 
2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-29/snapchat-said-to-be-valued-at-
16-billion-in-new-fundraising [https://perma.cc/PK84-DVGC]; Kyle Sanford, Snapchat Valuation Not 
Disappearing, PITCHBOOK DATA, INC. (Mar. 10, 2016), http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/snapchat-
valuation-not-disappearing [https://perma.cc/LPR2-2M4W] (noting that Snapchat retained its $16-
billion valuation despite reports that Fidelity had marked down its investments in the company). Users 
can “draw” on their photos, add captions, and decide how long their photos can remain visible to re-
ceivers. See Alexis C. Madrigal, What Is Snapchat?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.
theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/what-is-snapchat/281551/ [https://perma.cc/L5HK-94NC]. 
 261 According to blog postings on the Snapchat website, Snapchat offers Snapcodes (allowing 
users to add friends to Snapchat), Snapchat Discover (allowing users to explores stories through dif-
ferent editorial teams), Snapcash (allowing users to use their debit cards to send money to friends’ 
bank accounts), and Our Campus Story (allowing users to adds to stories happening on a particular 
college campus), to name a few. See Introducing Discover, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Jan. 27, 2015), http://
blog.snapchat.com [https://perma.cc/V6H9-ETFQ]; Introducing Snapcash, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Nov. 
24, 2014), http://blog.snapchat.com [https://perma.cc/V6H9-ETFQ]; Our Campus Story, SNAPCHAT 
BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/100253858835/our-campus-story [https://perma.
cc/K9RQ-2JBA]; Snapcodes, SNAPCHAT BLOG (May 4, 2015), http://blog.snapchat.com [https://
perma.cc/V6H9-ETFQ]. Snapchat also just ventured into political advertising, landing its first political 
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According to its LinkedIn profile, Snapchat has between 51 and 200 em-
ployees.262 As with Pinterest, information about Snapchat’s revenue is not 
readily available, so stockholders and employees alike (unless they are major 
investors) have no visibility into the financial state of the company. 
2. Snapchat Form D 
In its most recent Form D filing, filed on May 28, 2015, Snapchat report-
ed that thirty-five investors had invested in the offering, none of whom were 
unaccredited investors.263 The federal exemption they relied on was Rule 
506(b) and the total offering amount was $650 million.264 
3. Snapchat Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
Snapchat’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Snap-
chat Restated Certificate”) was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State on 
February 13, 2015.265 Snapchat has 1,248,729,280 shares of Common Stock, 
of which 730,000,000 shares are Class A Common Stock and 70,000,000 
shares are Class B Common Stock.266 The Class A Common Stock has one 
vote per share and the Class B Common Stock, unlike the Class B Common 
Stock of Airbnb and Dropbox, has no voting rights (except as required by 
law).267 Under the Restated Certificate, Snapchat authorized 448,729,280 
shares of Preferred Stock, which are divided into the following series: Series A 
Preferred Stock, Series A-1 Preferred Stock, and Series B Preferred Stock (the 
three of which comprise the “Snapchat Voting Preferred”); Series C Preferred 
Stock (which combines with the Snapchat Voting Preferred to make the “Snap-
chat Prior Preferred”); Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and 
Series F Preferred Stock (the three of which combine with the Snapchat Prior 
Preferred to make the “Snapchat Investor Preferred”); and Series FP Preferred 
Stock (which, together with the Snapchat Investor Preferred, makes the “Snap-
chat Series Preferred”).268 
                                                                                                                           
ad with the American Action Network, an outside group with close ties to the House Republican leader-
ship. See Ashley Parker, A First for Snapchat, N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT (June 6, 2015, 1:16 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/06/a-first-for-snapchat/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
955F-ZHX2]. 
 262 Snapchat, Inc., LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/snapchat [https://perma.cc/
S3PA-5GFM]. 
 263 Snapchat Form D, supra note 259. 
 264 Id. 
 265 See Snapchat, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 1 (Feb. 13, 2015) 
[hereinafter Snapchat Restated COI] (on file with author). 
 266 See id. 
 267 See id. at 16–17. 
 268 See id. at 1–2. Snapchat’s Preferred Stock is divided as follows: (1) 70,288,840 shares of Se-
ries A Preferred Stock, with the original issue price of $0.208515 per share; (2) 35,741,260 shares of 
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Unlike the other private companies that are discussed in this Part, the 
original issue price of Snapchat’s Preferred Stock has fluctuated significant-
ly.269 This has implications for stockholders, as the holders of preferred stock 
will get an antidilution adjustment so that they are made whole when the price 
per share decreases in subsequent rounds of financings. 
The voting rights are atypical in that the holders of Series FP Preferred 
Stock are entitled to the number of votes equal to ten times the number of 
shares of Class A Common Stock into which such shares of Series FP Pre-
ferred Stock could be converted.270 Furthermore, if the vote or approval of 
Snapchat’s Preferred Stock is required by law, then the Snapchat Series Pre-
ferred shall vote together as a class on an as-converted basis.271 In addition to 
the protective provisions for the Snapchat Voting Preferred, each series of Pre-
ferred Stock has a separate vote.272 But other than the separate series vote that 
the holders of Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Pre-
ferred Stock, and Series F Preferred Stock are entitled to under the terms of the 
Snapchat Restated Certificate, these specified holders of Preferred Stock will 
have no voting rights and are not entitled to vote on any matter.273 It would be 
helpful for minority stockholders to understand the difference between Series 
FP Preferred Stock voting rights and the voting rights of other holders of Pre-
ferred Stock. 
Furthermore, an increase in the size of the Board of Directors to more 
than four, unless it is to increase the size by one director for a new CEO of 
Snapchat, would require the vote or written consent of the holders of the ma-
jority of the outstanding Class A Common Stock, Series FP Preferred, and 
                                                                                                                           
Series A-1 Preferred Stock at $0.01453 per share; 40,932,220 shares of Series B Preferred Stock at 
$1.95445 per share; 16,000,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock at $3.40893 per share; 5,000,000 
shares of Series D Preferred Stock at $0.001 per share; 42,000,000 shares of Series E Preferred Stock 
at $0.001 per share; 21,000,000 shares of Series F Preferred Stock at $0.001 per share; and 
217,766,960 shares of Series FP Preferred Stock at $0.000020835 per share. See id. at 2–3. 
 269 See id. 
 270 See id. at 3. 
 271 See id. at 4. 
 272 See id. at 4–7. 
 273 See id. at 6–7. Under the separate series vote, as long as at least 50% of the Series C Preferred 
Stock remains outstanding (as adjusted for any stock dividends, combinations, splits, recapitalizations, 
and the like) the holders of Series C Preferred Stock are entitled to a separate series vote on (i) any 
amendments, alterations, or repeal of any provision of the Certificate of Incorporation that adversely 
alters or changes the voting or other powers of the Series C Preferred Stock different from other clas-
ses of stock with the proviso that any change to the authorized capital of Snapchat or issuing one or 
more series of capital stock or any other securities convertible into equity securities of Snapchat will 
not be deemed to affect the Series C Preferred Stock adversely, and (ii) any increase or decrease in the 
authorized number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock. See id. The holders of Series D Preferred 
Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F Preferred Stock are only allowed to vote or give their 
written consent only as required under section 242(b)(2) of the DGCL or as otherwise required under 
applicable law. See id. at 7. 
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Snapchat Voting Preferred, voting together as a single class on an as-converted 
basis.274 Therefore, the size of the Snapchat board is most likely determined by 
the votes of the Class A Common Stock and Series FP Preferred.275 The Voting 
Preferred, voting as a separate class on an as-converted basis, is entitled to 
elect one director and that director shall be entitled to one vote on all matters at 
the board meetings or in connection with any written consent.276 The holders 
of Series FP Preferred Stock, voting as a separate class on an as-converted ba-
sis, are entitled to elect two directors (each, the “Series FP Director” and, to-
gether, the “Series FP Directors”) and each of those directors is “entitled to that 
number of votes per director equal to the number of total authorized directors 
of the Board of Directors at the time of such vote” on all matters at the board 
meetings or in connection with any written consent.277 For example, if there 
are four board members, then each Series FP Director would get four votes. In 
other words, the Series FP Directors would control the decision-making pro-
cess. Lastly, the holders of Class A Common Stock, Series FP Preferred Stock, 
and Snapchat Voting Preferred, voting together as a single class on an as-
converted basis, are entitled to elect all remaining members of the board; such 
director(s) would be entitled to one vote.278 
The protective provisions for the Snapchat Voting Preferred necessitates 
the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding Snapchat Voting 
Preferred, voting together as a single class on an as-converted basis, in order 
for Snapchat to effect any redemption, repurchase, or payment of dividends 
with respect to Common Stock or Preferred Stock.279 The Snapchat Restated 
Certificate, however, excluded from such definition: 
[the] acquisitions of capital stock pursuant to agreements under 
which [Snapchat] has the option to repurchase shares at no more 
than cost upon the occurrence of certain events, such as the termina-
tion of employment or service, [and] acquisitions of capital stock in 
the exercise of [Snapchat’s] right of first refusal to repurchase such 
shares . . . [and] repurchases or dividend payments approved by the 
Board, including the vote of the Preferred Director, if such Preferred 
Director is a member of the Board at the time.280 
                                                                                                                           
 274 See id. 
 275 The author deduced this by calculating the number of votes the Class A Common Stock and 
Series FP Preferred Stock would have voting together. 
 276 See Snapchat Restated COI, supra note 265, at 7–8. 
 277 Id. at 8. 
 278 See id. 
 279 See id. at 8–9. 
 280 Id. at 5. 
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Regarding the liquidation preference, the holders of Snapchat Prior Pre-
ferred would be entitled to any distribution or payment upon such “Liquidation 
Event” (as defined in the Snapchat Restated Certificate) before any such distri-
bution or payment is made to the Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred 
Stock, Series F Preferred Stock, Series FP Preferred Stock, or any Common 
Stock.281 Any remaining assets after the payment of the full liquidation prefer-
ence of the Snapchat Prior Preferred would be distributed ratably to the holders 
of the Common Stock.282 Provisions are also made for the Snapchat Series Pre-
ferred in the event of any Liquidation Event.283 
Each share of Snapchat Series Preferred automatically converts into 
shares of Class A Common Stock (1)(a) for the Snapchat Investor Preferred, 
upon the affirmative election of the holders of the majority of the outstanding 
shares of Snapchat Voting Preferred, or (b) for the Series FP Preferred Stock, 
upon the affirmative election of the holders of the majority of the outstanding 
shares of Series FP Preferred Stock; or (2) for the Snapchat Investor Preferred 
only, upon the closing of a firmly underwritten public offering covering the 
offer and sale of Class A Common Stock for Snapchat, which would result in 
gross proceeds of at least $25 million.284 There is also an unusual provision 
under the “Automatic Conversion” section of the Snapchat Restated Certifi-
cate. Any shares of Series FP Preferred purchased by an investor of Snapchat 
in connection with an equity financing in which it sells, at minimum, $1 mil-
lion worth of a newly-created series of Preferred Stock, such shares of Series 
FP Preferred Stock automatically convert immediately prior to such transfer 
into shares of Preferred Stock sold in the equity financing described above.285 
It is important for both employees and minority stockholders to understand the 
implications of the board composition, liquidation preference, protective pro-
visions, and conversion provisions described above to better comprehend the 
power dynamics of the board of directors, as well as their rights relative to oth-
ers. 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See id. at 9. 
 282 See id. 
 283 See id. 
 284 See id. at 14. 
 285 See id. Any shares of Series FP Preferred Stock transferred, other than pursuant to the equity 
financing, in which the Series FP Preferred Stock no longer retains voting power automatically con-
verts, immediately prior to such transfer, into shares of Class A Common Stock. See id. 
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E. Uber 
1. Overview of Uber 
Uber286 was founded in 2009 and has since roared ahead of its competi-
tors—Lyft and Sidecar—in the so-called “sharing economy.”287 It has raised 
$5.5 billion to date288 and was valued at $41 billion during its last round of 
financing.289 On its website, the company describes itself as follows: “Uber’s a 
smartphone app that connects people with cars with people looking for rides 
around town. Uber is the easy new way to turn your car into a cash machine 
and get paid weekly in fares for driving.”290 Using a software tool dubbed 
“God View,” Uber can see all vehicles on the Uber system and can pinpoint the 
location of every customer looking at the app on their smartphone.291 Investors 
ranging from Google Ventures to Benchmark Capital to tech luminary Jeff Be-
zos (through Bezos Expeditions) have invested in Uber.292 
                                                                                                                           
 286 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/main-street-
portfolios-are-investing-in-unicorns.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LA5H-6J8N] (noting that Uber is 
now valued at $50 billion); Maria Aspan, Most Startups Will Never Be Unicorns—And That’s Okay, 
INC. (May 12, 2015), http://www.inc.com/maria-aspan/uber-and-why-most-startups-are-no-unicorns.
html [https://perma.cc/H7CD-D32E] (citing the growing divide between the haves and have-nots in 
the startup world and touting Uber as a leader among unicorns in receiving funding). 
 287 The sharing economy means “using technology to connect consumers with goods and services 
that would otherwise go unused.” Marcus Wohlsen, What Uber Will Do with All That Money from 
Google, WIRED (Jan. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/01/uber-travis-kalanick/ 
[https://perma.cc/5PKT-8DY2]. In the case of Uber, it was a way to profit from limos and cabs that 
would otherwise be idle: 
In San Francisco, Uber has become its own noun—you “get an Uber.” But to make it a 
verb—to get to the point where everyone Ubers the same way they Google—the com-
pany must outperform on transportation the same way Google does on search. No less 
than Google itself believes Uber has this potential. In a massive funding round in Au-
gust led by the search giant’s venture capital arm, Uber received $258 million. The in-
vestment reportedly valued Uber at around $3.5 billion and pushed the company to the 
forefront of speculation about the next big tech IPO—and [Uber Co-founder and CEO 
Travis] Kalanick as the next great tech leader. 
Id. 
 288 See Uber Has Raised Nearly as Much Funding as All Other US on-Demand Startups Com-
bined, CB INSIGHTS (July 7, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/uber-bigger-entire-on-demand-
economy/ [https://perma.cc/W2MW-YTN4]. To put Uber’s fundraising into context, the rest of the 
U.S. on-demand economy has raised $5.9 billion. See id. 
 289 Alyson Shontell, Uber Raises $1.2 Billion at a $41 Billion Valuation, Vows to Become 
‘Smarter and More Humble,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/uber-just-raised-12-billion-2014-12 [https://perma.cc/62RR-HW2K]. 
 290 Apply to Drive with Uber, UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/search/ [https://perma.cc/Q4AD-
7DYY]. 
 291 Wohlsen, supra note 287. 
 292 See id. (stating that Google’s investment arm led a $258-million financing in August 2013); 
see also Alexia Tsotsis, Uber Gets $32M from Menlo Ventures, Jeff Bezos and Goldman Sachs, 
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Uber is the poster child for unicorns. As mentioned in Part II, Uber has 
over 3000 employees (a more specific number is not available).293 The most 
detailed look at Uber’s revenue was based on a leaked internal slide deck from 
early 2014, which was itself based primarily on December 2013 numbers.294 
According to the slide deck, in the month of December 2013, Uber generated 
$18 million in revenue in San Francisco alone.295 Although the author of the 
2014 report stated that this would mean $212 million in annual revenue, such 
extrapolation fails to take into account seasonal fluctuations and other fac-
tors.296 Another news article stated: “Gross revenue [for Uber] is expected to 
hit a run rate of $10 billion by the end of [2015]. . . . Uber’s revenue growth 
rate . . . [was] about 300% [in 2014] and it [was] expected to be another 300% 
[in 2015].”297 Furthermore, according to this article, the company’s current 
revenue derives from only a few of the over 150 cities in which it operated as 
of November 2014.298 Interestingly, in that same month, a different reporter 
from the same publication stated that Uber was in 230 cities.299 More recently, 
it was reported that Uber operates in 300 cities.300 Clearly, there is no reliable 
source of up-to-date information on the scope of Uber’s operations. This is yet 
another reason why enhanced disclosure in a centralized location, such as a 
unicorn’s website, is necessary. The disconnect between what is reality and 
what is myth can only be resolved by having the type of disclosure for which 
this Article argues. 
Despite Uber’s successes, however, the company is facing challenges. For 
example, it claims that its median driver makes $90,766 annually, but it has not 
                                                                                                                           
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/12/07/uber-announces-32-million-in-
funding/ [https://perma.cc/TF79-JAQ4]. 
 293 Kosoff & McAlone, supra note 109. Note that Uber does not consider its drivers to be em-
ployees. See Kia Kokalitcheva, Uber’s Employment Fight Just Got More Complicated, FORBES (Mar. 
4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/04/uber-driver-unemployment/ [https://perma.cc/8TZB-Y5YC] 
(discussing Uber drivers’ class action lawsuit against Uber asserting that Uber misclassifies drivers as 
independent contractors rather than employees). 
 294 See Alyson Shontell, LEAKED: Internal Uber Deck Reveals Staggering Revenue and Growth 
Metrics, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-
rides-drivers-and-fares-2014-11# [https://perma.cc/SNN3-8MLL]. 
 295 See id. (extrapolating that if one assumes $18 million in revenue is generated per month, then 
the San Francisco market would be worth $212 million). Of course, this type of extrapolation is not 
accurate, and the reporter was merely guessing at what the total revenue would be. 
 296 See id. The reporter should have used the term gross revenue, as the amount does not take into 
account that Uber receives 20% of the transaction fees. Also $18 million times twelve months equals 
$216 million (not $212 million). 
 297 Henry Blodget, Now I Know Why Investors Are Going Hog Wild About Uber, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 13, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-revenue-2014-11 [https://perma.cc/
VA9A-8XR5] (noting that Uber would receive 20% of the $10 billion, which would amount to $2 
billion—and the rest would go to Uber’s drivers). 
 298 See id. 
 299 See Shontell, supra note 289. 
 300 Isaac & Singer, supra note 104. 
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been able to substantiate that number.301 With falling fare prices and increases 
in Uber’s commissions, drivers are increasingly disillusioned with the compa-
ny and its promises:302 
From London to San Francisco to New York, they’ve banded to-
gether to protest against Uber. The rhetoric they once saw as uplift-
ing now seems deceptive and manipulative. Slowly but surely, Uber 
drivers are questioning whether Uber’s promises about wages and 
“small business” opportunities are actually aligned with reality. And 
in New York, the birthplace of this grass-roots labor movement, 
$90,766 is starting to flicker out.303 
Furthermore, unlike the virtual services delivered by Google and Face-
book, Airbnb’s and Uber’s services are delivered physically and locally. Ac-
cordingly, as Uber develops, it is subject to the unique regulatory, political, and 
cultural landscape of each individual city in which it operates.304 Put different-
ly, unicorns like Uber can affect entire local ecosystems—for better or worse—
and still not be subject to any measures of transparency, such as making their 
financial information publicly available. 
2. Uber Form D 
In its most recent Form D, filed on May 12, 2015, Uber reported that 142 
investors had invested in the offering.305 The federal exemption they relied on 
was Rule 506(c) and the total offering amount was $2,803,326,002.306 
                                                                                                                           
 301 See Griswold, supra note 107. 
 302 See id. 
 303 Id. 
 304 See William H. Janeway, Unicorns: Why This Bubble Is Different, FORBES (May 28, 2015, 
12:31 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20160131203453/http://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/
2015/05/28/unicorns-why-this-bubble-is-different/#5ac086007ee7. One author comments: 
Consequently, as [Uber and similar services have] been learning city by city, they are 
subject to local ecosystems that have evolved around the provision of such services: 
regulatory, political, cultural. The London taxi industry is not the same as that of New 
York nor San Francisco. The unbounded growth rates implicit in their valuations are 
subject to exogenous impediments that may induce step-function revaluations of growth 
prospects. 
Id. 
 305 Uber Technologies, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000154315115000002/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.
xml [https://perma.cc/4JXM-PWAR]. 
 306 Id. 
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3. Uber Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 
Uber filed its Restated Certificate of Incorporation (“Uber Restated Cer-
tificate”) with the Delaware Secretary of State on May 26, 2015.307 It author-
ized 2,496,670,392 shares of Common Stock, of which 1,558,693,776 was des-
ignated Class A Common Stock and 937,976,616 was designated Class B 
Common Stock.308 Uber also authorized 755,051,371 shares of Preferred 
Stock, respectively designated as Series Seed Preferred Stock, Series A Pre-
ferred Stock, Series B Preferred Stock, Series C Preferred Stock (consisting of 
Series C-1 Preferred Stock, Series C-2 Preferred Stock, and Series C-3 Pre-
ferred Stock), Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F 
Preferred Stock.309 
As with Airbnb and Dropbox, the holders of Class B Common Stock are 
entitled to ten votes per share.310 In addition, the holders of Series Seed Pre-
ferred Stock, Series A Preferred Stock, and Series B Preferred Stock are each 
entitled to ten votes for each share of Class B Common Stock into which such 
series could then be converted.311 In contrast, the holders of Series C Preferred 
Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, and Series F Pre-
ferred Stock are entitled to one vote for each share of Class A Common Stock 
into which such series could then be converted.312 
The holders of Series A Preferred Stock, voting together as a separate 
class on an as-converted basis, are entitled to elect one director.313 The holders 
of Series C-2 Preferred Stock, voting together as a separate class on an as-
converted basis, are also entitled to elect one director.314 The holders of Class 
B Common Stock, voting separately as a single class, are entitled to elect six 
directors of Uber.315 One of the most unusual provisions in the Uber Restated 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See Uber Technologies, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation 1 (May 26, 2015) [hereinaf-
ter Uber Restated COI] (on file with author). 
 308 See id. 
 309 See id. at 1–3. The Preferred Stock is designated as follows: (1) 174,029,880 shares of Series 
Seed Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $0.0090625; (2) 152,053,436 shares of Series 
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(7) 87,193,208 shares of Series D Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of $15.51305 per 
share; (8) 84,504,220 shares of Series E Preferred Stock with an original purchase price of 
$33.317575 per share; and (9) 25,227,947 shares of Series F Preferred Stock with an original purchase 
price of $39.638581 per share. See id. 
 310 See id. at 26. 
 311 See id. at 19. 
 312 See id. 
 313 See id. 
 314 See id. 
 315 See id. 
636 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:583 
Certificate states that the holders of Series Seed Preferred Stock, Series B Pre-
ferred Stock, Series C-1 Preferred Stock, Series C-3 Preferred Stock, Series D 
Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, Series F Preferred Stock, and Class 
A Common Stock cannot vote in the election or removal of any directors.316 
The Uber Restated Certificate further provides that each share of Pre-
ferred Stock automatically converts into shares of Class A Common Stock or 
Class B Common Stock in the event of a Preferred Stock Conversion Event (as 
defined in the Uber Restated Certificate) or an IPO of at least $30 million (net 
of underwriting discounts and commissions).317 
Furthermore, although the holders of the Preferred Stock are entitled to 
receive their investment back prior and in preference to holders of Class A 
Common Stock or Class B Common Stock in the event of any liquidation, dis-
solution, or winding up of Uber, the Series C Preferred Stock will receive 1.25 
times its respective original issue price.318 
In addition to an extensive list of Preferred Stock protective provisions, 
there are also protective provisions for each series of Preferred Stock.319 It is 
customary for securities repurchased from former employees, officers, direc-
tors, consultants, or other persons who performed services for Uber or any of 
its subsidiaries in connection with the cessation of such employment or service 
at the lower of the original purchase price or the then-current fair market value 
to be excluded from the Preferred Stock protective provision.320 Securities re-
purchased by Uber as approved by Uber’s board (including at least one Pre-
ferred Director so long as such director or any of his or her affiliates is not in-
volved in such repurchase) are also excluded. Although all this information is 
currently available to the public, posting the Form D at an easily accessible 
location—such as the SEC’s website or, better yet, the company’s website—
would provide a centralized source from which investors could draw accurate 
information. For example, investors could more easily reference an answer to a 
question in a Form D found on a unicorn’s website, such as “list the board 
members and the number of votes he or she has,” instead of searching for the 
answer within the often-complex Restated Certificate of Incorporation. Infor-
mation such as number of employees and amount of revenue should also be 
easy to access. Currently, a stockholder would need to search the Internet to try 
find that information—often in vain. 
                                                                                                                           
 316 See id. 
 317 See id. at 9. The Series C Preferred Stock, Series D Preferred Stock, Series E Preferred Stock, 
and Series F Preferred Stock have separate conversion arrangements. See id. at 9–12. 
 318 See id. at 2–3. 
 319 See id. at 20–24 (enumerating a long list of specific occurrences that would necessitate a Pre-
ferred Stock or Series Preferred vote, as applicable). 
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In conclusion, although Form D provides general information about the 
offering, revising it to include additional information is critical, particularly for 
the benefit of those who are not major investors.321 Additionally, although the 
Restated Certificates of Incorporation for these companies provide detailed 
information about the control and power dynamics within a company, that in-
formation is not readily accessible, nor is it easily understood by a layperson 
without the help of legal counsel. Therefore, this Article proposes modifying 
the information required by Form D to provide more relevant and understand-
able information to employees, minority stockholders, and others. Just as the 
securities filings of public companies are required to be on such companies’ 
websites, a unicorn’s Form D should be available in that manner as well. In 
addition, periodic disclosure of financial information should also be accessible 
by minority stockholders who otherwise do not receive such information. 
IV. PRIVATE IPOS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY AND EQUITY 
Part III highlights the need for more disclosure and details how unicorns 
are operating in a world of rumor and conjecture. This Part demonstrates how 
the problem is exacerbated by the fact that many unicorns are staying private 
longer despite calls for them to go public.322 Indeed, although many private 
companies have raised incredibly large rounds of financing, there has been no 
stampede of unicorns heading for the nearest exit.323 In fact, investors appear 
to be doubling down on the hottest unicorns. For example, in the case of Uber, 
Morgan Stanley’s wealthiest clients were given the opportunity to invest in a 
special fund offering $475 million of new preferred stock in the company.324  
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There is no financial data on Uber in the deal documents; Morgan Stanley ad-
mits “that it ‘has conducted limited due diligence’ . . . [and] has not ‘inde-
pendently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information.’”325  
In the first three months of 2015, in the San Francisco Bay area alone, 
nearly $5 billion in private money was invested in 300 deals.326 One reporter 
noted that during that time, “Only five companies from the region went public 
. . . raising less than half a billion dollars. That compares to nine IPOs in the 
region in last year’s first quarter, raising about $1.2 billion.”327  From 2012 
through 2014, on average there were thirty-six venture-backed tech IPOs per 
year; in 2015 there were twenty-three.328 In short, “profitability of the typical 
technology company plunged into negative territory over the past couple of 
years.”329 Historically, IPOs or mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) of private 
companies that venture capitalists have funded provide the lucrative exits these 
investors seek for their investments. On the acquisition side, 459 venture-
backed companies were acquired in 2014,330 of which “137 had disclosed val-
ues totaling $47.5 billion—roughly three times the prior year’s amount.”331 For 
example, Oculus VR, WhatsApp, and Nest Labs were each acquired for bil-
lions of dollars by large technology companies.332 In 2014, 115 venture-backed 
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companies went public,333 which “generated $121.1 billion in valuation that 
was generated by $13.8 billion total venture investment in those compa-
nies.”334 Corporate venture capital (“CVC”), in particular, had a banner year. 
According to the 2015 NVCA Yearbook, “[C]orporate venture investment dol-
lars increased 69% in 2014 and actually increased overall share. Corporate 
groups deployed an estimated $5.3 billion into 766 venture rounds. That’s the 
highest investment total by far in the post-millennium period.”335 In 2015, cor-
porate venture groups “deployed over $7.5 billion in 905 deals to high-growth 
startups,” hitting a fifteen-year high.336 
A ten-year study, however, tells a less rosy picture. This study analyzed a 
dataset of $1-billion-plus exits (which excluded companies that were still pri-
vate) from January 1, 2004, to June 30, 2014. The authors’ findings were as 
follows: 
During this 10-year period, there have been approximately 62 ven-
ture-backed unicorns that exited via IPO or M&A for $1 billion+. 
There were 451 investors who backed these 62 unicorns, including 
339 investments by traditional venture capital funds. Seventy-four 
different venture capital funds made these 339 unicorn invest-
ments. . . . Roughly just one-fourth returned an entire fund for any 
of their VC investors.337 
The study concluded that “out of 339 VC investments in unicorns over the last 
10 years, only 21, around 7 percent, returned an entire fund.”338 In 2015, there 
were seventy-two VC-backed companies that went public raising a total of $8 
billion; only 18% were from the tech industry.339 The number of IPOs and ac-
quisitions for venture-backed companies in 2015 declined from 2014 while the 
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amount of money contributed by CVCs continued to remain steady, compris-
ing 25% of deals for the last five quarters.340  
Although the number of venture rounds has declined, both venture valua-
tions and capital invested continued to rise until the third quarter of 2015.341 
There has been increased momentum of the venture capital market since the 
economic downturn of 2009.342 In the last quarter of 2015, however, there was 
a substantial decline in investment dollars for startups.343 Furthermore, venture 
capital firms raised less money and closed fewer funds in 2015 than in 2014.344 
The non-existent IPO market, decline in acquisitions, and slowing of invest-
ment dollars suggest that unicorns will remain private for the foreseeable fu-
ture. They will either continue to do business, raise money, hire employees, 
and issue stock with little to no transparency or simply become one of the so-
called unicorpses and cease to exist.345   
CONCLUSION 
Unicorns still capture the imagination of the venture capital industry and 
media alike. But for how much longer will the large infusion of cash and opti-
mism last? Not everyone has such a rosy take on the outlook for the uni-
corns—some industry insiders are predicting the demise of some subset of the 
species. For example, at the annual SXSW (South by Southwest) Interactive 
festival in Austin, Texas, one prominent venture capitalist remarked, “I do 
think you’ll see some dead unicorns.”346 In 2015, these pessimistic voices were 
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largely drowned out by the clamor of investors looking for the next unicorn, 
which may not be as elusive an animal as it once was. The end of 2015, how-
ever, saw an increase in negative sentiment as evidenced by mutual fund 
markdowns, fewer unicorn births, and a substantial decrease in mega-round 
financings.347 
The goal of this Article is not to argue that the current framework of ven-
ture capital deals does not work; in fact, on the contrary, it does work—and 
works quite well. It is the regulatory structure underlying these deals that needs 
to be addressed, particularly in the case of unicorns. In light of their enormous 
influence and impact, enhanced disclosure becomes necessary when private 
companies reach the size equivalent to or greater than public companies. For 
reasons of both efficiency and transparency, this additional disclosure (which 
would not be required of the vast majority of private companies) could be 
made through Form D and simply posted on the company’s website. Addition-
ally, periodic disclosure of financial information should be made available to 
all stockholders and employees, with key terms summarized in laypeople’s 
terms. Providing this information to these stakeholders would be relatively 
simple because companies are already contractually obligated to furnish it to 
their major investors. 
Although the restated certificates of incorporation are public documents, 
the Delaware Secretary of State only provides them for a fee.348 Therefore, the 
restated certificates of incorporation for unicorns should be posted on the 
SEC’s website and on unicorns’ websites, and the key aspects of these restated 
certificates should be disclosed on the Form D in layperson’s terms. If the uni-
corn relied on section 4(a)(2), then information similar to what it would pro-
vide to unaccredited investors should be made more broadly available, such as 
on the company’s website. Both current and prospective investors, regardless 
of their stake in the private company, would then have access to more pertinent 
information about their current or prospective investment, much as they would 
in the case of a public company. And employees who are minority stockholders 
would have access to this same information, as well. 
In the cash-rich environment in which unicorns came into being, it was 
easy for investors—both large and small alike—and employees to get caught 
up in the excitement of investing in companies that revolutionize the way that 
we have always done things or disrupt the status quo. Now, however, is the 
time to exercise some caution. Now is the time to look seriously at whether 
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having more and better information available to the public can help both inves-
tors and employees make more informed decisions when choosing whether to 
ride a unicorn. 
